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Abstract 
This paper provided a background for an ecological approach to 
psychological inquiry and examined the usefulness of point-light displays 
as a technique for applying such an approach to the study of dyadic social 
events. An experiment was conducted testing the accuracy of 
identification of three simulated dyadic events between participants 
viewing a full-visual and a kinematic only version of events. Results 
showed participants exposed to kinematic only optical information 
identified two of the three simulated dyadic events as well as those 
provided a full-view version of events. However, for a more gesturally 
neutral event, perceivers made more accurate identifications in the full-
visual condition. This finding suggests that the information necessary for 
participants to make accurate identifications of this dyadic event was 
either not available, not attended to, or inadequate in the point-light 
displays. It was suggested that point-light displays were useful in the 
examination of dyadic social events but some constraints on their usage 
appeared to be necessary. Results between free-verbal and forced-choice 
response conditions showed that participants made more accurate 
identifications in the forced-choice condition, suggesting that adaptive 
modification of perception (attunement) increased accuracy. Contrary to 
expectations, no support was found for the theory that perceptual learning 
would increase the ability of participants to abstract and differentiate 
progressively finer levels of invariant structure through experience, and no 
differences were found between males and females. 
It was suggested that information for the assessment of dyadic 
social events with high levels of gestural animation (a) is available to 
participants in the dynamics of movement, (b) resides in the invariant 
structure of optical information available directly to those able to attend to 
and acquire such information, and (c) even with some limitations, point-
light displays are a useful tool in isolating these invariants. 
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The Ecological Approach 
"Each thing says what it is - a fruit says 'eat me'; water says 'drink me'; 
thunder says 'fear me'; and woman says 'love me'" 
- Koffka1 1935 (p. 7). 
Introduction 
The ecological approach to the investigation of psychological 
phenomena is set apart from traditional approaches to psychology. The 
theory originally posited by James J. Gibson1 highlighted an animal's 
sensitivity to the structure of the energy available in the ambient array that 
invariantly specifies characteristics of importance to that particular animal 
(Michaels & Carello, 1981). Gibson in essence gave priority to what 
information might exist in stimulation that would permit an animal to 
achieve veridical perception of its particular environmental niche, rather 
than how animals make sense of such environmental stimulation. Gibson 
based such an argument on the assumption that stimulation is specific and 
not in need of calculation. Instead, Gibson speculated that information is 
structured energy that specifies properties of the environment significant 
to an animal, provided that the animal is sensitive to such structure in the 
ambient array. 
1 James J. Gibson, 1950, 1959, 1963b/1988, 1966, 1970, 1972/1982, 1974/1982, 1975, 1979. (see 
Lombardo, 1974, 1987; Michaels & Carello, 1981; Reed, 1988; and/ or Reed & Jones, 1982 for an 
in-depth discussion of direct theory, information, affordances, and the other theories of James 
J. Gibson). 
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To further elucidate such an ideology requires a closer examination 
of the fundamental components of an ecological approach to the study of 
psychology. These components are: 




(e) perception and action. 
(f) perceptual learning. 
The next section will discuss each of these topics from an ecological 
perspective and demonstrate: 
(a) that perception as an adaptive activity guides biologically, 
psychologically, and socially functioning behaviours. 
(b) how perceptual information is revealed in dynamic 
interactions with the environment of surfaces, objects, 
places, and other persons. 
(c) that structured light and sound specify affordances (i.e., 
opportunities for action and interaction). 
(d) how evolutionary design, personal history, intentions, 
and the current environmental context of the perceiver 
determine the perceiver's attunement to particular 
affordances of objects, places, and persons. 
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As Gibson (1979) stated, "An understanding of life with one's fellow 
creatures depends on an adequate description of firstly what these 
creatures offer and then secondly on an analysis of how these offerings are 
perceived" (p. 42). 
The unit of analysis 
As in physics, for Gibson and others (Alley, 1986, 1988, 1990; Baron, 
1980, 1981; Ginsburg, 1990; Good, 1986, 1987; McArthur & Baron, 1983; 
Michaels & Carello, 1981; Reed, 1991; Runeson, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1994; 
Shaw & Bransford, 1977; Turvey, Shaw, Reed, & Mace, 1981; Zaft 1989, 
1995) the physical concepts of environment and the biological and 
psychological concepts applied to animals are fitted to one another in a 
larger system of mutual constraint. Therefore, such traditional concepts 
like perception and action should be viewed as activities which includes 
both animal and environment within a particular ecosystem and not taken 
solely as properties of the animal (Newtson, 1990; Shaw, Mace, & Turvey, 
1994; Vicente, 1990). The underlying assumption in an ecological approach 
is that of ecological monism: the animal, the environment, and the 
interaction are studied as one ecosystem, not in isolation. 
Such a monastic theory assumes the organism is active in and 
interactive with the environment in some way and information about 
action and interaction is chosen in the context of some useful, purposeful 
action (Garling & Evans, 1991). If, as Gibson believed, perception is the 
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detection of useful information, and useful information is structured 
energy in the ambient array, and such information enables an animal to act 
in an adaptive way within its environment, then both animal and 
environment are mutually constrained and any study of one must 
incorporate the other. 
Others put forward similar arguments. Vygotsky (1962) argued that 
the unit of analysis for psychological inquiry must retain all the basic 
properties of the whole. He maintained that these properties cannot be 
further reduced or divided without the subsequent loss of the actual 
properties them.selves. Still and Good (1992) echoed the idea that to be 
meaningful, the study of psychology had to include both the organism. and 
the environment within which it functions. 
Such arguments were presupposed by Gibson as early as 1950. His 
theory of perception in the visual world implied that the animal, the 
environment, and the interaction between animal and environment should 
be the functional unit of analysis for psychological inquiry. Later, when 
expanding upon his theory of affordances, Gibson suggested that external 
stimulation is information for the animal about an environment, and how 
that information is organised or structured could be informative in its own 
right. More over, there exists a partnership of mutual constraint between 
the animal and its environment (Gibson, 1972/1982, 1975, 1979). As 
Ginsburg (1990) suggested, perception from. an ecological perspective "is a 
relational phenomenon, dealing with certain aspects of the perceiver-
environment relation" (p. 357). 
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However, if the interaction between animal and environment is to 
become the unit of analysis for psychological endeavour, then one must 
note Gibson's (1950) argument that such interactions between an active 
perceiver and an informing environment take place in space and over time. 
Therefore, the dynamic event, comprising the animal, the environment, and 
the interaction between the two, becomes the unit of analysis for 
psychological investigation. 
Such a principle runs contrary to the traditional concept of absolute 
space and time which constrains perception to the 'now' and suggests that 
perception of dynamic events takes place in space-time (Michaels & 
Carello, 1981). An ecological, direct approach to perception supports 
Newtson and Engquist (1976) who argued the most distinctive 
characteristic of ongoing behaviour is change over time. Newtson (1990) 
elaborated further, suggesting that the unit of psychological analysis is the 
animal-environment ecosystem and this ecosystem is observable in space 
over time. Ginsburg and Smith (1993) agreed, stating that the object of 
study for psychology should be the structure of the "temporally extended 
environment in which the perceiver is active" (p. 196), thereby supporting 
Gibson's contention that perception is of events, not of objects isolated in 
space and time (Michaels & Carello, 1981). 
Event perception then, like all perception, is the perception of 
sequential information CTohansson, von Hofsten, & Jansson, 1980; 
Verbrugge, 1985). It is evident that from an ecological perspective the 
proper unit of analysis for psychological inquiry is the animal-
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environment ecosystem as it unfolds in space over time. 
Information 
" ... the other person has a surface that reflects light, and the 
information to specify what he or she is, invites, promises, 
threatens, or does can be found in the light" (p. 136). 
- Gibson, 1979. 
To examine the animal-environment ecosystem as it unfolds in 
space over time requires an understanding of the nature of the information 
available to an active perceiver that specifies temporally extended events. 
What is required to support such a unit of analysis is a functional 
definition of information. Gibson (1961) argued that information is the 
structure that specifies an environment to an animal and that such 
information is carried by higher-order patterns of stimulation, often over 
time (see pages 9-13 for a discussion of invariants). As Michaels and 
Carello (1981) explained, such patterns are informative about the world. 
In Gibsonian terms, information about something means specificity to 
something; in other words, meaning is specified in the structure of the 
ambient array (Gibson, 1966). 
Lee (1974) echoed Gibson's theory that there is a lawful structure in 
the global array and that the structure in the stimulation available to a 
particular animal able to attend to that information constitutes information 
about the world. Gibson (1966) made the case that the senses are 
perceptual systems that pick-up facts about the world and that "stimulus 
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energy, unless it has structure, conveys no information" (p. 245). Michaels 
and Carello (1981) explained Gibson's argument by asserting that 
information is the bridge between animal and environment. They 
suggested Gibson explained information as bi-directional structure in the 
ambient array that carries higher-order patterns of stimulation which may 
specify an environment to an animal. Runeson and Frykholm (1983) 
claimed the ability to perceive something "rests on the availability of 
information to specify it in the domains of the sensitivity of the perceiver. 
Hence, the viability of the ecological approach hinges on whether a good 
case can be made for the existence of such information" (p.586). 
Gibson's (1961) ecological optics was a description of such 
information available in the ambient array of light reflected and re-
reflected from surfaces. He showed that the array was highly structured at 
each of the extremely large number of station points available in a setting. 
For example, for a group of people standing in a large dining room, the 
flat surface of the dining room table is uniquely specified by the structure 
of the light reflected from the flat table top to each individual in the room, 
regardless of their location within the room. Movement of the perceiver in 
the environment, on the other hand, makes available to that perceiver a 
spatio-temporal pattern of optical structure which is characteristic of the 
path of motion. Again, with relation to the table top, if an individual were 
to slowly sit down on a chair in the room, the changes in angles from the 
light reflected from the table top is mathematically linked to the 
individual's direction of motion. Therefore, the structure in the ambient 
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array not only specifies the table top, but the motion of the individual as 
well. 
Gibson illustrated how the array specifies the real environment, and 
with motion, specifies it uniquely relative to the animal. But if structure in 
the ambient array defines information, then a further understanding of 
such structure is necessary to accommodate an understanding of 
psychology from an ecological perspective. 
Invariants 
Gibson (1950) argued that invariants are patterns of stimulation 
which are left unchanged over space-time while other aspects of the array 
are undergoing transformation. Invariants therefore are potentially 
informative about the environment and an animal's relation to it, and 
constitute lawful relations between objects, places, and events in the 
environment as well as the form, manner or structure of change in the 
patterns available in the ambient array. Gibson (1966) further argued that 
since stimulation occurs over time, as well as over space, and has temporal 
as well as spatial structure, invariants are present in the stimulus 
transformations over time. He argued it is the pick-up of these invariants 
that permits perception of the permanent properties of things, that these 
invariant properties specify the objects of the world and the layout of its 
surfaces. He further argued that these invariants may be under 
transformation, non-changing patterns of stimulation available in the 
9 
evolving, changing, global array, and that such invariants are lawfully 
governed by the laws of physics and maths. He concluded that it is the 
invariant properties of the ambient array that carries information. 
Michaels and Carello (1981) gave an account of Gibson's concept of 
invariants. They provided definitions of the two types of invariants, 
structural and transformational: 
Structural invariants: "properties that remain constant (an 
invariant pattern of stimulation over time) even though there are 
other properties that change" (p. 25). For example, the melody to 
'Yankee Doodle Dandy' is the same whether it is played on a piano, 
harmonica, or violin. The melody is a structural invariant that 
specifies the song. 
Transformational invariants: "the style of change in the medium 
that specifies the change occurring in or to the object, person, or 
event" (p. 26). For example, when an automobile goes around a 
corner, the transformational invariants specify the turning, while 
structural invariants specify the automobile. 
Direct perception holds that these invariants (structural and 
transformational) are embedded in a continuum of space-time and may be 
picked up directly by perceivers with the capability of acquiring the 
information, and who are attending to that information available in the 
stimulation. 
For example, many psychologists thought of 'constancy' as a 
developmental process of intellectual construction (Piaget, 1960). 
However, since stimulation occurs over time, as well as over space, and 
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has temporal as well as spatial structure, invariants are present in the 
transformations over time. It may be the pick-up of these invariants that 
permits perception of the permanent properties of things (E.J. Gibson, 
1969, 1991) as opposed to an internal process. Considering an event as a 
unitary occurrence in time with a beginning, a duration, and an end, then 
invariants over continuous transformations in time may be the basis for 
perception of that event. For example, Bassili (1979) showed the 
importance of temporal organisation in the recognition of emotions by 
demonstrating that parts of the face move together in characteristically 
different ways for different emotions. The facial transformations over time 
provided enough information for individuals to identify the nature of the 
emotion being exhibited by the target person. Shaw and Pittenger (1977) 
showed invariant structure in ageing faces and how that structure 
transforms over time in a lawful fashion retaining specificity to the 
individual face. Archer and Akert (1977) wanted to find out what it is in 
the interactions between people that informs the individuals involved as to 
the nature of their relationship. They found that transformational 
invariants available in the optical array could specify such social events 
such as parenting, winning, and friendship. 
It appears that invariant structures may not only specify objects, 
places, and events in the environment, but also the activities of the animal. 
McArthur and Baron (1983) suggested that while the physical appearance 
of humans reveal certain structural invariants (backbones, limbs, erect 
posture), transformations of the physical structure may reveal invariants 
11 
that directly specify the nature and meaning in social interaction. Good 
(1986, 1987) conducted an experiment that showed participants could 
make very accurate identifications of social events, such as an unwanted 
sexual advance and a teacher reprimanding a student, when viewing 
events devoid of all but the structural information of movement. 
Vicki Lee (1988) agreed that the meaning of social events may be 
specified in the ambient array by arguing that "conduct has structure and 
the structure of conduct is the proper object of research and theory in 
experimental psychology" (p. 119). Likewise Smith and Ginsburg (1989) 
submitted that an invariant, when detected, constitutes the opportunity for 
the animal to behave in a particular way; in other words, afforded a 
particular action potential. Gibson (1966, 1972/1982, 1979) believed that 
invariants are available to perceivers able to acquire such information and 
that these invariants can be picked up over time by perceivers. Shaw and 
McIntyre (1974) argued that the acceptance of invariants means "placing 
psychological, physical, and biological phenomena on equal footing within 
a framework of an objective reality that favours none of them but 
accommodates them all" (p. 359). This approach provides an integrated 
framework that appreciates the constraints inherent in the relationship 
between the psychology of the animal and the laws of physics and biology 
existing in the natural world. This mutuality of relationship is an 
important difference between the ecological and cognitive approaches to 
psychological inquiry. 
McArthur & Baron (1983) suggested that "we have learned much 
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about the processing of information and little about what that stimulus 
information is" (p. 215). The ecological approach, unlike previous, more 
traditional approaches, offers a functional definition of information. From 
an ecological perspective, information is the structure in the ambient array 
that specifies an environment to an animal with direct relation to the 
particular animal's sensitivity to that information and the animal's ability 
to act on that information. Gibson's concept of affordances distinctively 
brings the animal and environment together in a system of mutual 
constraint. 
Affordances 
The ecological approach argues for an animal-environment monism, 
linking animal and environment into a relationship of mutual constraint. 
Nowhere is this linkage more evident than in Gibson's theory of 
affordances. Gibson (1979) defined the affordances of the environment as 
"what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good 
or ill" (p. 127)2. Gibson explained that the term implies a complementarity of 
the animal and environment. In his theory of affordance, Gibson believed 
that the functional utility of certain objects or configurations of objects 
needed to be attached to the action capabilities of the animal. He 
maintained that the functional utilities or action possibilities may be 
specified in the physical properties of environmental objects or object 
2 Use of bold as in Gibson's original text. 
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complexes, thereby providing information for perception that directly 
specifies the affordances available a particular animal provided that 
animal is capable of acting upon (effectuating) such an affordance (Gibson, 
1979). Again, the environment and the animal within that particular 
environmental niche are both specified in Gibson's theory of affordances. 
Shaw, Turvey and Mace (1982) provided a more functional 
explanation of an affordance: 
"A situation or event X affords action Y for animal Z on occasion 0 
if certain relevant compatibilities between X and Z obtain" (p. 211). 
They also defined the action capabilities of the animal (effectivities) with 
relation to the environment: 
"An animal Z can effect action Y on an environmental 
situation or event X if certain relevant mutual compatibilities 
between X and Z obtain" (p. 212). 
In other words, the behaviours the animal is capable of are constrained by 
the environment. The two are in a relationship of mutual constraint and 
one cannot be specified without reference to the other. Affordances and 
effectivities are innately relational. As Greeno (1994) suggests, neither an 
affordance nor an effectivity can be specifiable without specifying the 
other as both operate in a state of mutual constraint. 
According to Gibson (1979), it is the affordances on offer within a 
particular environment that are perceived by an active, exploratory animal. 
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Michaels and Carello (1981) suggested that when animal and environment 
are viewed as a single, mutually constraining unit, then animals are born 
to detect and learn to detect the affordances of their environment through 
perception and action. Reed and Jones (1982) agreed, arguing that active 
perception is controlled by a search for the affordances of the environment 
and active behaviour is controlled by the perceiving of these affordances 
(Gibson, 1972/1982, 1974/1982, 1975). Gibson (1979) emphasised that 
affordances must be taken with reference to an observer but are not 
"properties of the experiences of the observer. They are not participative 
values" (p. 137). Gibson found support from Ginsburg (1990) who 
suggested an animal perceives what behaviours can be entered into with 
respect to the environment. Such an argument places meaning as the 
equivalent of affordance, thereby making meaning directly detectable in 
the ambient array and not a mental construct. 
Researchers into body and ability scaling offer support for Gibson's 
arguments (Mark, 1987; Warren, 1984; Warren & Whang, 1987; Zaff, 1989; 
Zohar, 1978). For example, Warren (1984) found that the perceptual 
boundaries between climbable and unclimbable stairs corresponds to a 
constant proportion between the height of the step and the individual's leg 
length. Mark (1987) studied eye height and its relationship to the 
maximum height of a chair participants considered they would be able to 
sit upon. He found a constant ratio between the perceiver's eye height and 
the height of the chair. 
If an individual's physical size and abilities as well as his/her 
15 
activities restrict the kind of information that he/ she finds useful, a theory 
of perception must incorporate action. From an ecological perspective, the 
activities of an individual are "assumed to always be constrained by an 
interaction between the individual's capabilities and the properties of the 
environment that envelops that individual" (Zaff, 1995, p. 238). The 
animal and the environment are in a system of mutual constraint and one 
cannot be studied in isolation from the other. 
Inherent in Gibson's theory of affordances is an active, perceiving 
animal capable of exploratory and performatory action. Exploratory 
actions discover the affordance properties of environmental objects, places, 
and/ or events, while performatory actions exploit the perceived 
affordances (Owen, 1993). According to Reed (1988), Gibson defined the 
difference between the two as one of intentionality. Reed believed that 
intention is the active, striving nature of perception when an animal is 
seeking information and not merely having it presented to him/her, and 
argued that intention and interaction are functional variables within 
events. Zaff (1995) further illuminated intention describing it as the 
detection by an individual of a particular set of invariants from the total 
available inventory of invariants available to that individual within a 
particular environmental event. He argues that it is the intention of the 
individual that determines the particular affordances that the individual 
chooses to take into account with relation to a particular event or situation. 
To illustrate this concept, imagine a running person stopping by a 
fence. The fence may afford leaning against (resting) if the runner is tired. 
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However, if the person is being pursued by a potential mugger, the fence 
may afford hiding behind (avoiding being mugged). In each instance 
(resting or avoiding) the intention of the individual determines the 
behaviours afforded by the environmental property (the fence). Thus, an 
explanation of how the perception of affordances constrains an 
individual's behaviour is taken only when referenced to the intentions of 
the individual and that those intentions are compatible with the 
individual's "relationship to its surroundings" (Zaft 1989, p. 30). The 
ultimate goal of the individual is specified by the selection of criteria 
congruent with the intentions of that individual (Turvey, et al., 1981). 
According to Zaff (1989t "once the final condition of some nested event 
has been specified with respect to the intentions of the individuat his or 
her attention will then be directed toward the particular set of affordances 
that will result in the performatory activities appropriate to satisfy those 
intentions" (p. 30). Intentionality becomes specifiable, exists in the world, 
and is tractable. 
The ramifications of affordance theory serve two purposes with 
reference to social psychology. According to Baron and Boudreau (1987) it 
provides firstly a "deeper insight into certain phenomena that are jointly 
relevant to personality and social psychology" (p. 1223). For example, an 
individual's mood may be specified directly by the patterns of their 
behaviour, and these patterns of behaviour are structural and 
transformational invariants which can be picked up directly in the ambient 
array by other individuals capable of attending to such information. 
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Secondly, affordance theory may provide a "model for how one might 
achieve a conceptual integration between personality and social 
psychology" (p. 1223) by providing a common unit of analysis. 
Baron and Boudreau proposed that affordances are both objective 
and participative within a relationship of mutual constraint between the 
animal and its environment and that there exists in each environment "a 
plethora of nested affordances, only some of which are appropriate to any 
given animal" (p. 1223). If meaning is detectable in the affordance 
properties of objects, places, and events1 and intention is specifiable, exists 
in the world and is tractable, then human interactivity must be governed 
by the same laws. If so1 then social affordances, as well as the intentions of 
individuals, should be detectable within an interactive event between two 
or more individuals. 
However, it must be noted that affordance theory does not suggest 
or even infer that perceivers will always be correct in their identification of 
the affordance properties of environmental stimuli. As Gibson (1979) 
stated, affordances are what the environment "offers" (p. 127) the animal. 
It does not necessarily mean that the animal will take advantage of that 
affordance. Attention to the wrong or different information is allowed for 
within an ecological framework. Furthermore, Gibson (1979) argued that 
perception and action are linked, with perception taking place over time. 
Such a theory allows for changes in not only what the environment affords 
an individual at any point in time, but also the needs and intentions of the 
individual within that environment. When being chased by a mugger, a 
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fence may afford hiding behind, but once the chase has ended, that same 
fence may afford resting upon. Again, the individual and the environment 
are mutually constraining over space and time and perception takes place 
overtime. 
This is a radical departure from the traditional, cognitive view that 
person properties are internal and not specified in the environment but 
constructed in the head. From a cognitive view, the perceptual system is 
transparent as stimulus energy impinging on the receptor cells must by 
necessity be processed and manipulated internally before individuals can 
make decisions or judgements enabling action. This theory ignores the 
possibility, as proposed in an ecological approach, that perceivers are 
sensitive to certain information in the ambient array and that that 
information may be informative in its own right and not in need of 
processing. 
In relation to social psychology, McArthur and Baron (1983) 
suggested socially important qualities such as dispositions, emotions, or 
moods are specified by the structure in the ambient array for perceivers 
available and able to detect it. Berry and Finch Wero (1993) discovered 
links between dispositional properties and facial appearance. They found 
that participants were able to predict a target person's social dominance, 
interpersonal warmth, and honesty from the structure of their faces. Such 
a result suggests that social perception could be the activity of attending to 
the invariant structure in the social environment and what it may afford 
the perceiver. 
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This argument is at odds with cognitive theories for several reasons. 
Firstly, cognition assumes a mind-body dualism in which perception is the 
end product of a chain of causal events that begin in the world and finish 
up inside the head of the animal (Smith & Ginsburg, 1989). The emphasis 
is on how the perceiver makes sense of the world as a passive observer 
separate from it. It might be suggested that processes proposed prior to a 
careful examination of the specificity of information available in the 
ambient array is, at the very least, premature. There is evidence that 
animals have evolved "smart mechanisms" (Runeson, 19776) able to detect 
certain environmental information. These mechanisms are not transparent 
at alt but selective and able to pick-up information directly (Turvey et al., 
1981). There appears to be an evolutionary relationship of mutual 
constraint between the animal and the environment that is not dualistic 
and has evolutionary significance. 
Secondly, theories of cognition require an internal representation of 
the world with the unit of analysis a schema or category subserved by 
cognitive processes such as abstraction, generalisation, classification, and 
storage. In cognition, something needs to be added to perception by way 
of the mediating process (E.J. Gibson, 1969). Cognitive theories are 
attempts to understand how the individual makes sense of the world. 
Direct theory and the ecological approach instead examines what there is 
in the ambient array that informs the individual directly and suggests 
information exists in the ambient array that is informative in its own right 
and not in need of organisation or extension in the mind. 
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Thirdly, cognition assumes information existing in the world is 
inadequate or non-specific. McCabe (1986) suggested that cognitive 
theories with both an empiricist and Kantian heritage consider information 
as either unstructured, overwhelming, or hidden, thus requiring some 
form of processing by the mind. However, there appears some circularity 
in the reasoning that requires some foreknowledge of the meaning of input 
in order to select which of the many schema or categories to activate. As 
argued by Turvey and Shaw (1979), the nonspecificity of input should 
cause some alarm for cognitive theorists. It does not appear, even from a 
cognitive perspective, that input can be nonspecific. If it was, then each 
and every schema or categorisation must be matched against each and 
every input. Given that the cognitive approach considers the perceptual 
system to be transparent to all information, this appears to be an inefficient 
and laborious process. Although such processes cannot be ruled out 
entirely, a case appears to be building from an ecological perspective that 
the outcome of inferential processes cannot be "indifferent" (Runeson & 
Frykholm, 1983, p. 587) to the available information. 
Perception and action 
Nested within Gibson's theory of affordances is the link between 
perception and action. From an ecological perspective, affordances are the 
ordinary referents of perception and action. Central to this approach is the 
argument that perception is the pick-up of useful information. The activity 
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is considered "direct in the sense of not entailing inference or similar 
constructive operations on insufficient input data" (Runeson & Frykholm, 
1983 p.586). There is evidence of specialised receptor cells (Runeson, 
1977b) and sensitivity to units of behaviour, such as critical changes in joint 
angles (Newtson & Engquist, 1976), which supports direct perception. 
However, as discussed, what and how information is detected is 
constrained by the needs and intentions of the animal. As action 
engenders perception, the formation of the "animal's action system can 
constrain the form and timing of its own regulation" (Michaels & Carello, 
1981, p. 51). Animals and their environments are entrained as mutually 
constraining systems (Baron & Boudreau, 1987; Cutting, 1982) as action is 
constrained by perception and perception by action. Michaels and Carello 
(1981) stated this as follows; "the action system (effectivity structure) and 
the environment (affordance structure) are in a relationship of mutual 
constraint" (p. 54). This suggestion that action and perception operates as a 
system with specificity to the individual perceiver, that organisms detect 
invariants or collections of invariants that specify the behaviours afforded 
by the object, place, and/ or event, indicates the individual and the 
environment do indeed operate in such a system of mutual constraint. 
Gibson further argued that perception and action are relational and 
non-deterministic in that perception is the active exploration of the 
ambient array, the search for available information, and the optimising of 
its pick-up. According to a direct approach, what structure is selected for 
attention by the animal becomes part of the animal's repertoire of potential 
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detectable features of the environment provided that what is selected is 
affirmed as useful. Perception of events is, therefore, task specific, the task 
the perceiver is performing interacts with information in stimulation to 
effect strategies of perceiving as well as what is perceived, making 
perception and action inseparable (Michaels & Carello, 1981). McArthur 
and Baron (1983) also noted that perception serves an adaptive role for the 
animal inasmuch as it informs and is informed by action. 
If perception constrains actions in such a way so that useful aspects 
of the environment are continuously revealed, then actions themselves 
have potential to be used as metrics. However, as Owen and Warren 
(1982) argued, the measure of performance needs to be relational with 
some parameter of information available to the individual, and these 
measures of performance could only be determined from the variables and 
invariants under the control of the individual involved. So, if perception is 
continuously revealing useful aspects of the environment, and occurs in 
space over time, then the structure of stimulation will have flow. Heft 
(1990) argued that perception is not limited to a moment in time. Move 
perception away from the 'now', and it is possible to discover that 
stimulation is tractable in prior interactivity, inherent in current 
interaction, and may project into the future. Action could be tractable (and 
measurable) through past behaviour, current behaviour could be 
immediately observable, and future action could be predictable. Thus, by 
measuring action, perception can be empirically tested without placing 
unnatural constraints on the participant. Such results could then be 
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transferred into the real world and offer an empirical alternative to 
traditional cognitive approaches. By taking the ecosystem as the natural 
unit of analysis, researchers can examine psychological phenomenon 
considered intrinsic in cognitive theories. Such concepts as dispositions, 
traits, emotions, and moods move from the realm of being inside the head, 
to tractable, measurable, even predictable actions observable within the 
flow of stimulation available in dynamic events. 
Perceptual learning 
" ... practice seems to increase precision of discrimination of 
variables actually present in stimulation, and to detect 
relevant variables or distinctive features not previously 
detected" (p. 33). 
- E.J. Gibson, 1963. 
As mentioned previously, perception is not passive reception, but 
an active, adaptive and regulatory search which focuses on useful 
stimulation in the ambient array (E.J. Gibson, 1969). In humans, for 
example, the process begins in the newborn infant with visual attention to 
certain stimulus properties in the optical array that carry information, such 
as motion and edge sensitivity. In the infant's development of object 
perception, for example, objects gradually become differentiated from one 
another by their distinctive features. Size and shape are differentiated 
within the first few months, even before the baby can walk or reach, and 
object constancy develops early in life (E.J. Gibson, 1991). Differentiation 
of the environmental layout may also develop without having to be 
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supplemented with knowledge, involving information-processing, 
invoking schemas/ scripts, and/ or any other constructive processes. 
Ecological research supports arguments in which invariant 
structures are picked up by infants without prior experience of events. For 
example, the visual cliff experiments of E.J. Gibson and Walk (1960), the 
facial perception and recognition studies of Bassili (1978) and Fantz (1966), 
the optical looming experiments conducted by Schiff (1965), the infant 
voice recognition findings of DeCasper and Fifer (1980) and the results of 
intermodal learning experiments using infants by Bahrick (1988) all lend 
support to this argument. 
Even further support comes from Newtson, Engquist, and Bois 
(1977) who argued "perception is an ongoing, interactive process. The 
perceiver monitors the stimulus for certain kinds of action-defining 
information, and, when suitable information is picked up [ at what they call 
a 'breakpoint'], the search is modified in that that information becomes, in 
part, a basis for discrimination of the next action unit [breakpoint]" (p. 
857). They found that certain portions of the overall movement of 
individuals in action were more specificational than others, and 
participants could make accurate identifications of actions when exposed 
to only these small portions of the event. In other words, they found that 
perceivers do not necessarily need to pick-up all available information, but 
that lower-order invariants may specify higher-order ones. In essence, 
they argued that structure may not need be wholly apparent for accurate 
perception of events. Perceivers may need (and learn) to attend to only 
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certain parts of the information available to make sense of the world. 
Runeson (1990) argued that skill acquisition is learning to attend to certain 
information available in the ambient array with particular specificational 
properties for a particular event, and that experienced experts learn over 
time what information to attend to in order to make accurate 
identifications of such events. These findings supported the case made by 
the Gibsons (1955a, 1955b) who considered the psychology of perceptual 
learning to be about learning to perceive more of the differentiating 
qualities of stimulation in the environment rather than increasing the 
animal's ability to differentiate through associated responses as a result of 
past experience. The Gibsons argued that "the main difficulty in the way 
of the traditional enrichment theory is its implication that learning 
involves a decreasing psychophysical correspondence between perception 
and stimulation" (Gibson & Gibson, 1955b, p. 448). They contended that 
perceptual learning consists of responding to variables of physical 
stimulation "not previously responded to" and suggest the notable point 
about this theory is that "learning is always supposed to be a matter of 
improvement- of getting in closer touch with the environment" (Gibson 
& Gibson, 1955a, p. 34). 
Perceptual learning is adaptive but does not change the 
environment. Instead, perceptual learning is gaining an increasing 
understanding of the adaptive relationship between the environment and 
behaviour. Consequently, attention should be focused on the interaction 
between animal and environment and stimulation should not be 
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considered simply energy impinging upon a perceptual system 
constructed wholly of transparent receptor cells (E.J. Gibson, 1969). It may 
be the extraction of information that characterises perception, and it is the 
increasing ability to extract this information that characterises perceptual 
learning and development. 
The criterion of perceptual learning, then, is achievement of greater 
specificity between stimulation and discrimination, increasing 
differentiation, and pick-up of invariant relations. Perceptual 
development, then, is the development of perceived invariants. The 
criterion of perceptual learning is an increase in specificity, the increased 
ability to acquire and differentiate progressively finer levels of invariant 
structure. 
As Gibson (1950) suggested, perceptual learning is the education of 
an animal's attention, and attention is the selective aspect of perception 
(Pick, 1979). Adaptive modification of perception should result in better 
link between the information available to an animal in the ambient array 
and the events, objects and/ or places that are the sources of stimulation. 
In addition, as E. J. Gibson (1969) argued, such adaptive modification of 
perception should enhance the ability of the animal to use the potential 
stimulation available. Barwise and Perry (1983) suggested that specificity 
of information must be contingent upon existing constraints and these 
constraints can vary from natural laws to conventions and/ or temporary 
agreements between individuals or groups of people. This argument 
prompted Runeson (1990) to suggest that skill acquisition could occur 
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through modification of how one uses one's perceptual system rather than 
through some cognitive process with functioning occurring in the 
perceptual mode entirely. 
From the perspective of ecological-social psychology, E.J. Gibson's 
(1969) perceptual differentiation theory suggested that perceptual 
attunements develop at the same time as the development of behavioural 
abilities. According to McArthur and Baron (1983) there may be much to 
learn "about the development of social perceptions (i.e., the social 
invariants to which perceivers at a given developmental level are attuned)" 
(p. 220) from an analysis of the "behavioural goals that the social 
perceptions can serve" (p. 220). McArthur and Baron (1983) suggested that 
at "the most fundamental level, there must be a match between the 
animals' receptor capabilities and the stimulus information to which they 
are perceptually sensitive" (p. 218) arguing that "perceptual systems have 
evolved to be sensitive to the types of structured information available in a 
given ecological niche" (p. 218), and this would include social events. In 
phylogeny there appears then to be evidence within animals of an 
increasing differentiation between invariants in the ambient array and a 
continuing progression of the capacity of the animal to detect higher-order 
invariants in the flow of stimulus information. 
The research of Berry (1991b) lends support to such an argument. 
She showed that although both adults and children could correctly identify 
the sex of moving point-light faces at a greater than chance level and 
greater than the accuracy levels found for static facial displays, it was 
28 
beneficial for children (but not adults) to be provided with socially elicited 
patterns of facial behaviour in a sex identification task. Her results suggest 
that as people grow in maturity they become more sensitive to finer levels 
of invariant structure and can abstract and differentiate higher orders of 
invariant structure, certainly in relation to sex differentiation. This finding 
supported E.J. Gibson's theory of perceptual learning as well as an 
ecological approach to the study of social events. 
Summary 
From an ecological perspective, the study of perception is the study 
of the interaction between animal and environment within a particular eco 
system (Vicente, 1990). Information, defined as invariant structure in the 
available ambient array, provides contact between the animal and the 
environment. Information then is referenced with respect to the animal-
environment relationship that it specifies as well as the animal to whom 
that relationship is specified. Gibson's theory of affordances argued that 
the cooperative nature of animal and environment, when allied with 
perception and action, leads to the argument that animals are born to 
detect and learn to detect the affordances of their environment directly 
(Michaels & Carello, 1981). As such, affordances are the primary referents 
of perception. From an ecological perspective, the purpose of perception is 
to constrain actions in such a way as to continuously reveal useful aspects 
of the environment (i.e., perception constrains action and action constrains 
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perception). Perception is relational in nature in that the objects of interest 
are animal-environment relations. Therefore, as Heft (1989) suggested, to 
examine perception and action it is necessary to accept that the animal is 
an active participant within a particular environment, that the interaction 
between animal and environment is relational with respect to what the 
environment has to offer and what the animal is capable of effectuating, 
and that behaviour must be viewed as a stream over time. An affordance 
then equates to functional meaning and the natural transformation of 
meaning over time ( evolution) through continued interaction between the 
animal and the environment. Inherent within such an approach is the link 
between perception and action, and the possible acceptability for 
researchers to utilise actions instead of perceptual reports. 
Whereas ecological science traditionally examined the biological 
basis of environmental stimulation impinging upon the transparent 
receptor cells of the animat ecological psychology focuses on the 
examination of the information transactions between animals and their 
environments. The physical concepts of environment and the biological 
and psychological concepts applied to animals are fitted to one another in 
a larger system of mutual constraint. As suggested by Shaw, Mace, and 
Turvey (1994) the traditional psychological concepts (for example, 
perception, action and knowing) may no longer be viewed solely as 
properties belonging to a particular animal, but as activities of an 
ecosystem that includes both animal and environment in a system of 
mutual constraint. The implications for traditional social psychology are 
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to re-examine the basic unit of analysis and the methodology applied to 
such an exploration, and to use an ecological, monistic approach to the 
study of social interaction as part of an animal-environment ecosystem. 
This study took an ecological approach to social event perception by 
using point-light techniques that reduce stimulation in the optical array so 
that only the motion patterns of the actors was available to participants. 
The aim was to determine if perceivers could accurately identify the nature 
of dyadic social events when presented with whole-body patterns of 
movement. In other words, can the structure of whole-body movements of 
individuals involved in a social event provide enough information for 
perceivers to accurately identify that event? And if so, will perceptual 
learning take place over repeated exposure to events? However, before 
such a task can commence, it is important to discuss point-light techniques 
and the theory behind them. 
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The Kinematic Specification of Dynamics and the 
Utility of Point-Light Displays 
"One may create versions of the original stimulus in which 
particular aspects of the stimulus are systematically 
degraded or subtracted out until only the dimension to be 
studied remains" (p. 150). 
- Berry (1990c) 
Introduction 
Heider and Simmel (1944) were among the first to suggest motion 
patterns may be of significance in social perception. Gibson (1966) too was 
interested in visual motion patterns. He suggested that optical information 
could guide locomotion in animals by specifying both the invariant 
surrounding surfaces and the movement of the animal within them. 
Michotte (1963) was the first to study biomotion when he examined the 
perception of larva motion. Johansson (1973) later defined biological 
motion as "the motion patterns characteristic of living organisms in 
locomotion" (p. 201). Runeson and Frykholm (1981) combined the ideas of 
informational invariants and biological motion in studies using point-light 
displays3 to examine the visual perception of lifted weights. They 
concluded that the weight of the box was specified in the kinematic 
information available to perceivers, and that the visual system was 
3. Point-light techniques use reflective patches attached to 
actors so that when events are filmed or video-taped, replay can 
be adjusted in such a way as to only exhibit the patches which 
appear on the screen as lights. Such techniques devised by 
Johansson in 1973 are a means of providing kinematic information 
to participants. See pages 48-54 for a full discussion of point-
light techniques. 
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efficient at picking up such information. They argued that if dynamics 
was taken to mean "anything that has an influence on the course of an 
event" (p. 733), and perceivers could pick-up this information directly from 
the ambient array, then, as suggested by Gibson (1979), such animal-
dynamic properties as intention or mood should be specified in the 
ambient array "without having much to say about what properties of shape 
or motion conveyed the information" (Runeson & Frykholm, 1981, p. 733). 
This suggestion prompted Runeson and Frykholm (1983) and 
Runeson (1985, 1994) to argue there were relations of specificity between 
properties of movement and persons, and these properties were not 
hidden or intrinsic as suggested by traditional cognitive theories, but 
specified in the kinematic information available to a perceiver viewing a 
dynamic social event. For Gibson, Runeson, and others (Alley, 1990; 
Michaels & Carello, 1981; Newtson, 1990, 1994; Shaw & Bransford, 1977) 
information available for perception is specific, has validity extending over 
time, and is meaningful. There appears to be information embedded in the 
patterns of moving, interacting organisms to specify not only the nature of 
the event, but also the person properties previously considered 'hidden' 
such as the moods, intentions, and emotions of individuals (Berry, 1990c; 
Berry & Finch Wero, 1993;. Berry & McArthur, 1986; Good, 1986). That 
these properties are available to perceivers and are specified in the 
structure of information, is the basis of an ecological approach to social 
psychological inquiry. 
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According to Good (1987) social perceivers are aware (a) of the 
properties of others; (b) they share such knowledge with others; (c) they 
acquire knowledge in the presence of others who do likewise, and (d) they 
explore their environments in pursuit of their goals. Good's findings fitted 
nicely with Gibson's (1974/1982) argument that people are not only parts 
of their environment, but also perceivers within it. Gison suggested that 
within social environments, individuals perceive not only other perceivers, 
but also what the other perceivers are perceiving. According to Gibson, in 
this way social observers are aware of a shared environment which is 
common to all, not just belonging to the individual observer. Gibson 
(1979) suggested that this reciprocality of affordances is lawful and, while 
it may be involved, such mutuality is based on the pick-up of invariant 
information in the ambient array. Gibson suggests therefore that the social 
psychology of knowledge is based in ecological optics and in the 
individual's ability to pick-up the optical invariants over time. 
The existence of social invariants has empirical support. Berry 
(1991b) found that systematic relations exist between particular patterns in 
stimulation and particular social perceptions such as gender sensitivity, 
and, furthermore, perceivers can be quite adept at extracting this 
information. Hodges and Baron (1992) showed that artifacts and actions of 
physical-social settings revealed values as well as laws and rules, and 
Berry and Misovich (1994) demonstrated that the structural and dynamic 
characteristics of people were lawfully related to their dispositional 
qualities. 
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While the argument for an ecological approach to social psychology 
appears to be gaining interest, how does one get at the information 
specifying the nature of social interaction and the previously 'hidden' 
person properties inherent in a cognitive premise? Runeson (1977a) 
provided a good starting point with the development of his KSD principle 
- the kinematic specification of dynamics. 
The kinematic specification of dynamics - the KSD Principle 
Runeson (1977a) applied the concepts of physics to the study of 
event perception. From the field of physics he utilised the concepts of 
kinematics and dynamics. Physics defines kinematics in relation to 
displacement, velocity, and acceleration which are primarily derived from 
distance and duration. Variables used to report change in the "geometrical 
configurations" (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983, p. 588) of an event over time 
are assigned to the area of kinematics. Physics explains dynamics as 
variables (such as mass, momentum and force) that "cause or constrain 
motion" (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983, p. 588). According to Runeson and 
Frykholm (1983), variables involved in influencing a particular course of 
events are considered to be in the "domain of dynamics" (p. 588). Todd 
and Warren (1982) agreed, asserting that kinematics considers aspects of 
pure motion without need to refer to the potential forces or masses 
involved, while the various forces involved in motions or maintaining a 
stable system state fall into the domain of dynamics. Runeson and 
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Frykholm (1981) further suggested that as soon as a "minimum degree of 
complexity is exceeded, the kinematic patterns of events contain 
information about relevant dynamic properties" (p. 733). Johansson (1973) 
then Runeson and Frykholm (1981, 1983) and subsequently numerous 
other researchers (Berry, 1990a, Bingham, 1993; Good, 1986, 1987; Mather 
& West, 1993) have used point-light techniques to show the 
informativeness of such kinematic information. 
If information is available in the kinematic pattern, it is also 
available as higher-order properties of the optic array, thus making direct 
visual perception of dynamic properties possible. Although Runeson's 
analysis dealt with inanimate objects, he argued that similar principles 
hold true for events involving living organisms (Runeson, 1985, 1988, 1990, 
1994; Runeson & Frykholm, 1981, 1983). He suggested that by taking 
dynamics in the wider sense to mean anything that has an influence on the 
course of an event, one might include moods, intentions, expectations, 
dispositions, and abilities to be specified in the ambient array. This 
argument suggested that social events and dyadic interactions might fit 
comfortably into the realm of dynamics. 
Runeson posited his KSD-principle, which stated: 
(1) Dynamic factor a influences the kinematic shape of 
movementM. 
(2) Hence, the kinematics of M specify a. 
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The KSD-principle, stated simply, is that movements specify their causes 
through structural and transformational invariants available in the optical 
array to animals who are capable of picking up such information and who 
are attending to it. 
For example, representations of animate activities have turned out 
to be easily produced by synthetic displays of moving and changing 
geometrical figures (e.g., Bassili, 1976; Heider & Simmel, 1944; Runeson, 
1977a), suggesting visual perception is fundamentally linked to whatever 
dynamic aspects may be indicated in the kinematics as opposed to being 
linked to the kinematics in isolation. It has been argued that these 
specificational dynamics may have social relevance by specifying such 
traits as intentions (Heft, 1989) and emotions (Runeson & Frykholm, 1986). 
Indeed, the laws of physics appear to apply equally to social interaction. 
Runeson and Frykholm (1983), Berry (1990a, 1991a,b), Berry and Finch 
Wero (1993), Berry and Springer (1993), Bingham (1993), Cutting and 
Kozlowski (1977), Good (1986, 1987), and others have shown that 
kinematic information is linked to such social phenomenon as deceptive 
intent, sensitivity to changes in facial patterns, recognition of friends by 
their gait, and accurate perception of simulated social events. 
According to Runeson and Frykholm (1986) change of one dynamic 
factor cannot "be substituted for or cancelled by change in another" (p. 
262). They argue that the multidimensionality and nonlinearity of animate 
motion can "simultaneously yet separately" (p.262) specify different 
dynamic factors in the kinematic pattern. The anatomical make-up of an 
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animal constrains its movements by limiting what the animal can or cannot 
physically do and is also a major determinant as to what shape the 
movement of the animal will finally take (Runeson & Frykholm, 1986). 
Reed (1982) suggested that the occurrence of pre-adjustment of posture is a 
universal feature of an animal's action system. This prompted Runeson 
(1985) to argue that the human anatomical system is designed so that each 
particular action incorporates the required postural compensations and 
sensory feedback prior to such compensations is not an obligatory 
requirement. Rather, Runeson (1986) argued that "active and reactive 
effects are lawfully related through mechanics and the action system is 
organised to take advantage of this" (p. 59) lawful relationship. Therefore, 
the KSD-principle stated that movements of individuals specify the causal 
factors of events in the world and that the nature of the event is specified 
as well as the activities, current, past, and future, of the individual(s) 
involved. 
A closer look at deceptive action helps to illustrate this argument. 
The findings above suggest that deceptive action should, at best, only be 
able to recreate some of the kinematic details of an intended activity, but 
other aspects of the kinematic pattern will be altered in such a fashion as 
not to be congruent with the intended activity. In other words, 
information available in the ambient array may actually specify the intent 
to deceive as well as the real nature of the actual event. Therefore, it could 
be suggested that both the true conditions and the deceptive intentions are 
available in the kinematics of the event to a perceiver able to attend to such 
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information. Indeed, the research into deceptive intent by Runeson and 
Frykholm (1983) and Bingham (1993) showed that perceivers were adept at 
picking up information specifying deception in a simple lifted weight 
experiment. Their results supported the argument that the kinematic 
pattern inherent in action is useful information in its own right for the 
perception of dynamic properties, even person properties that, from a 
cognitive perspective, are considered hidden or intrinsic. 
However, despite the utility of Runeson's KSD-principle, Runeson 
and Frykholm (1983) suggested there were some restrictions on the use of 
kinematics. These are: 
(1) "Kinematic specification can be effective only in some 
activities, notably those where the property in question is a 
sufficiently strong contributor to the unfolding movement. 
Vigourous whole body movements will generally be more 
appropriate" (p. 598). 
(2) "Perception requires not only potential information but 
also corresponding attunements of the perceptual system. 
Informational specificity is not to be equated with perceptual 
saliency. Depending on property concerned and activity 
observed, person-in-action perception may range from the 
simple noting of the obvious to requiring the utmost of 
educated attention" (p. 598). 
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(3) "Facial expressions, gestures, styles, and so forth, are not 
rendered inefficient by kinematic specification. Kinematic 
specification should instead be viewed as an addition to the 
informational support for social knowing with particular 
value for perceiving true, as opposed to expressed, 
conditions" (p. 598). 
The present study examined these three suggestions. However, to do so 
required a further understanding of both biological motion and motion 
events. 
Biological motion 
Johansson (1973) considered biological motion as the "motion 
patterns characteristic of living organisms" (p. 201). In forward locomotion 
the rotational movement of the various limb segments in a coordinated, 
angular motion creates a smooth sinusoidal curve around the human's 
centre of mass. This invariant pattern uniquely specifies forward 
locomotion in humans. In addition, each person's unique body 
proportions produce a different variation of this figure-eight pattern that 
can specify even more specific characteristics of that particular individual 
such as sex, age, and even identity (Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977; Montepare 
& Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988; Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1993; Runeson & 
Frykholm, 1983). 
Newtson (1990) argued that a "sequence of different actions consists 
of a succession of different dynamical systems" (p. 168). He found that 
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each action requires reorganisation of the body into different coordinative 
structures with new specificity to "actor and observer" (p. 168) alike4. 
Newtson, Engquist, and Bois (1977) had earlier measured these successive 
reorganisations by assessing the changes in joint angles. As these 
specificities change, they argued that information flows into or out of the 
system. In other words, as movement changes so too does the kinematic 
structure, and what that structure specifies at any given point in time may 
change as well. Therefore, behaviour consists of a flow of movement 
within an interaction and a flow of information in and out of that 
interaction. Newtson, Hairfield, Bloomingdale, and Cutino (1987) found 
such information flow to be highly periodic. They argued that information 
flow in interaction between two persons is significantly coupled 
("interaction is joint action" (p. 233)) and a constant, observable phase 
relation is maintained. They also suggested that such invariants are do not 
reside in the head of the individual, but in "their relation to their 
environment" (p. 233), making such information directly available to the 
perceiver. Furthermore, Newtson et al. confirmed the existence of points 
of definition (action unit boundaries to the shifts in coordinative 
structures) or breakpoints (Newtson, 1976), and these breakpoints are 
found in ongoing action. Newtson (1990) argued that these breakpoints 
contain sufficient information to specify the behavioural waveform from 
which they are drawn, that these waves are coupled in interaction, and 
4 Turvey (1990) provides further evidence and discussion on 
synchronous coordinated activity. 
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that this information is directly observable and measurable through 
analysing behaviour. 
Results such as these are contrary to any representational argument 
that might be forthcoming and is one reason for advancing an argument 
based on specificity in perception and action as opposed to cognitive 
representations. If, as Newtson (1994) suggested, a stable, dynamic system 
is created when the various units of the body are coupled with the forces 
in the environment, then the result is a human action system that is 
constrained from a biological perspective and realised by the 
establishment of surrounding body structure, not cognitive structures. 
These particular configurations of the body require the constraints of the 
environment to operate smoothly. The system then exists in the 
relationship between the animal and the environment, including variables 
in the animal and in the environment with the animal's body components 
organised to fit the task at hand. In such a system, the animal specifies the 
environment and the environment specifies the animal. 
Runeson and Frykholm (1983) argued that to the extent that 
emotions determine movements, they are "specified in the kinematic 
pattern by biomechanical necessity" (p. 612). In other words, emotion, 
intention, mood, and other previously considered intrinsic or hidden 
properties of people are physical forces subject to the lawful relations 
inherent in the KSD -Principle. Therefore, as Runeson and Frykholm 
(1983) and Runeson (1994) suggested, kinematic information in a dynamic 
event may specify such activities. This study examined such a position. 
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The ability of perceivers to accurately identify the nature of three different 
dyadic social events was tested with each dyadic event specifying a 
particular relationship between actors ranging from anger to happiness to 
a more neutral everyday meeting of friends. 
Motion events 
The Gibsonian view that perception and action are inextricably 
linked in an animal-environment eco-system assumes interaction; 
interaction designates an event in which there is some effect5• As Berry 
and Finch Wero (1993) suggested, useful information is most likely 
revealed in dynamic, multimodal stimulus events that unfold over time, 
and perceivers are fairly skilled at extracting information from the stream 
of behaviour, and under some conditions are able to do so very rapidly. 
Ambady and Rosenthal (1992) showed that the accuracy of social 
judgements based on length of exposure to samples of behaviour was just 
as good for participants making 30 second observations of behaviour as it 
was for those viewing the behaviour for a full 4 minutes. Research into the 
visual perception of non-animate and animate events, such as collisions 
(Todd & Warren, 1982), muggings (Grayson & Stein, 1981), social actions 
(Good, 1986, 1987), facial and vocal changes (Berry, 1991a), ageing effects 
on social perceptions (Berry & McArthur, 1986; Berry & Zebrowitz-
McArthur, 1988), perceiving lifted weights (Runeson & Frykholm, 1981), 
5 Oxford Paperback Dictionary defines interact v. "to have 
an effect on each other. interaction n." 
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and deceptive intent (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983) has established the 
existence of structural and transformational invariants in motion events 
with specificational information available to an animal able to detect it. 
Even supposedly 'hidden' internal dynamic properties of objects 
and persons can be visually perceived when viewing events, and results 
strongly suggest event perception involves perceiving dynamics (Runeson, 
1985). Runeson argued there is a firm informational basis for direct 
perception of persons-in-action and persons-in-interaction. He concluded 
that for persons-in-action, specific kinematic patterns are visually available 
for detection through the pick-up of invariant structures existing in the 
ambient array. He further suggested that such invariant structures are 
lawfully related to automatic and biological factors of the animal that, over 
time, determine distinctive acts or actions that are specifically goal-
oriented. In the social environment, Runeson suggested that people have 
available to them immediate information about both what others are doing 
and what others intend to do in action over time. Patterns of movement of 
an animal in an event interact with the information in the environment to 
produce systems that specify the animal-environment relation itself and 
such systems can be dynamically stable. Runeson suggested these systems 
extend in space and time and can produce self-organising structures with 
apparency over time, therefore constituting an event. 
Runeson further argued that each object or event specified has some 
permanence over time and an animal can remain informed of the nature of 
an event or object even in the absence of continuous sensory contact 
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(Bingham & Runeson, 1988). In other words, the kinematics may specify 
the intended dynamics of an event without the event actually eventuating. 
To illustrate the argument that intention may be specified in the 
kinematic patterns inherent in action, imagine a person starting to rise 
from a seated position. The activity of starting to rise exhibits a postural 
kinematic pattern available to the observer, the person is about to get up 
from the chair. However, as has happened to all of us, just as you are 
about to get up from your seat, something on the television stops your 
intended exit. The kinematics specify your original intention of getting up, 
yet the actual dynamics of rising do not eventuate. 
Runeson (1985) believed that "the actually occurring kinematic 
pattern is indeed specific for the conditions that generated it" (p. 48) and 
perceivers can be sensitive to discrepancies in this pattern. What is 
important, according to Runeson, is that co-ordinative structures are "set 
up more or less in advance of action, and thus may prevail in the system 
for extended periods even when the person is not moving at all" (p. 60). 
Runeson suggested that "movements are specific to all those aspects of the 
person that influence the movements" (p. 60), and available to perceivers in 
the form of "complex invariants definable over the total kinematic pattern 
of an event" (p. 60). If an observer can accurately report on the properties 
of a target person or persons, then information specifying those properties 
must exist in the ambient array, be available to, and be attended to by the 
observer. 
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Baron (1990) agreed, suggesting that different dispositions generate 
characteristic event profiles with affordance information given perceivers 
who are prepared to "detect or discover what they can do to or with 
environmental entities" (p. 138). If presentation is in kinematic form only, 
it could be concluded the person properties identified are specifically 
involved in shaping the movements in the event (Runeson, 1985). These 
two points are extremely relevant to nonverbal research in that kinematics 
may specify the intentions, expectations, emotions, and moods of the target 
person, and perceivers can obtain this information directly and accurately 
without having to evoke schemas and/ or scripts. These mutuality 
relations may be fine.,.tuned at two levels; the information level, and at the 
level of acquisition (Baron, 1990). Active information pick-up sets the 
ecological position apart from the traditional cognitive approaches to 
psychology in that it considers that useful information not only exists in 
the world but at the same time has meaning that can be regulated and 
controlled by the animal (Putnam, 1988). 
According to Runeson and Frykholm (1983), to produce 
discriminable effects, actions must exceed a certain degree of vigorousness 
to provide the perceiver with enough kinematic information to make 
veridical judgements. Human beings have evolved a perceptual system 
attuned to transformations in the structure of the ambient array, and these 
patterns, available across space and time, specify the nature of events 
(Berenthal & Profitt, 1984; Johansson, 1973; Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977; 
Mace & Shaw, 1974; Mather & West, 1993; McCabe, 1986; Runeson & 
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Frykholm, 1981, 1983). According to McCabe (1986) when something 
moves, or appears to move by a change in the perspective of the observer, 
the patterns produced by the transformations specify the identity of the 
object or person, or the nature of the event. Consequently, it can be argued 
that it is unnecessary to abstract, represent, or construct objects, persons, or 
events inside the head if they are already specified and available in the 
ambient array. Invariants (structural and transformational) therefore not 
only specify the object, person, or event, but are actual properties of the 
object, person, or event. McCabe (1986) further argued that since many 
objects, people, and/ or events share many invariant properties (i.e., 
humans stand erect and walk on two legs, most birds have two wings, 
table tops tend to be flatt it might be useful to reverse the 
similarity/ equivalence equation and propose that equivalent things are 
similar because they are related, not related because they are similar 
(Quine, 1973). 
This argument should hold equally true for events involving more 
than one individuat with many social events exhibiting the same or nearly 
identical invariant structure at one or more levels, but differences at one or 
more other levels. However, although the information may indeed be 
available to perceivers, the pick-up of relevant information may vary 
across events and perceivers. Differences between individuals could be a 
result of variations in perceptual learning, the education of attention 
during the pick-up of structure in the ambient array specifying the nature 
of particular events (E.J. Gibson, 1963, 1969). This study considered such a 
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proposition by examining events in an effort to discover whether or not (a) 
perceivers could make accurate discriminations of dyadic social events in 
free-verbal and forced-choice response conditions, (b) repeated exposure to 
events would result in more accurate forced-choice identifications of those 
events, and (c) educating a parceiver's attention as to the possible nature of 
events would have an impact on their accuracy in identifying events. 
Point-light techniques 
Point-light displays provide a method for isolating what 
contribution kinematic information makes in specifying the dynamics of 
events. According to Runeson (1985) "any state or characteristic of a 
person that has physiological aspects or consequences that could influence 
the action system are within reach" (p. 59) using point-light displays. 
Johansson (1973) suggested that his point-light techniques secured the 
proximal stimulus in a "geometric-kinetic analysis" and that such 
anchorage is a "consequence of the insight that all the information 
available" (p. 210) is given in the optical array. In other words, 
information is available in the dynamics of motion, is lawfully governed, 
and available to perceivers in the ambient array. Johansson argued that 
such information can be effectively studied using point-light techniques. 
Good (1986) stated that point-light displays are effective research tools for 
social psychologists for three reasons: 
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(1) as social interaction is an active event, such displays provide 
natural and active stimulus configurations. 
(2) such configurations are free from contextual or situational 
information that may provide confounding or contradictory 
information. 
(3) point-light displays "provide a means of assessing just how little 
stimulus information" (p. 8) is required for veridical perception of 
social events. 
Indeed, research to date suggests a high degree of utility for such a 
technique. Johansson (1973) found that perceivers could rapidly and 
consistently identify walking human figures from as few as five pairs of 
lights. He also discovered using point-light displays that participants 
could readily identify running, climbing, and cycling. He even found that 
people could quickly identify human couples involved in the social 
interactivity of dancing. In each case Johansson stated that "spontaneous 
and correct identification of the types of activity was made without 
exception" (p. 204). Perhaps controlling the location and number of lights 
could also prove beneficial in determining just which, if any, of the 
locations and/ or particular movement patterns were more or less 
informative. 
Evidence that human movement could specify sex was found by 
Cutting and Kozlowski (Cutting & Kozlowski, 1977; Kozlowski & Cutting, 
1977) even though their displays were very brief, supplying observers with 
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limited information over time with which to make their judgements. 
These results were expanded upon by Runeson and Frykholm (1983) and 
confirmed earlier results that perceivers can use kinematic movement in 
events specifying not only sex, but the nature of events under 
investigation. They demonstrated that kinematic point-light displays 
supported perception of sex, activity, intention/ expectation, and apparent 
intention (either deceptive or emphatic). McDaniel and Odom (1983) used 
point-light techniques to report that infants demonstrated a visual 
preference for facial expressions of emotion over static displays or face-
shaped masks. 
Good (1986, 1987) reported results of a pilot study on the perception 
of social interaction and suggested observers could determine from point-
light displays of kinematic motion which social event they were viewing, 
some with very high levels of accuracy. For example, Good (1986) showed 
that participants in a 7 choice forced-choice experiment could identify a 
chance meeting of old friends 100% of the time when presented with 
kinematic information only. He showed that even complex dyadic events, 
such as a headmaster reprimanding a pupil or an unwelcome advance at a 
disco, were adequately specified in the kinematic information for 
participants to make high levels of identification, 77% and 95% 
respectively. He concluded that the kinematics of biological motion in 
social interaction can be informative enough to specify the nature of 
intentional social actions. Montepare and Zebrowitz-McArthur (1988) 
used point-light displays to find significant agreement among judges for 
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impressions of previously 'hidden' person properties such as dominance, 
happiness, industriousness, approachability, and sexiness. They also 
demonstrated that a person's gait serves as a potent source of information 
about a variety of personal attributes. 
It appears that the gait of an individual may specify more than just 
the dynamics of movement. Grayson and Stein (1981) found that the 
'muggability' of a person was specified in the gait of potential victims. 
They had criminal respondents view videotapes of individuals walking 
through a high crime area of New York City and rate each individual on 
their potential for assault. Differentiation of movement categories revealed 
that the typical victim would not have a medium stride, as expressed in 
terms of body-scaled dimensions, but a stride either longer or shorter than 
the mean. They also found that individuals rated high in muggability also 
tended to lift their feet while walking as opposed to exhibiting a fluid 
swing movement, and they moved their arms and legs unilaterally as 
compared to the contralateral leg and arm movement of non-victims. 
Grayson and Stein concluded that non-victims tended to have an 
organised quality about their body movements as compared to victims, 
and criminals were particularly adept at attending to this information. In 
other words, to a potential mugger, the muggability of an individual is 
specified in the kinematic transformations of the individual over time. 
Other research has shown that perceivers can pick-up information 
specifying person properties from kinematic information. Berry (1991b) 
discovered that both adults and children could correctly identify the sex of 
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transforming point-light faces at greater than chance level, and that the 
accuracy levels for moving point-light faces was greater than those found 
for static facial displays of point-light faces. Berry (1990c) also reported 
that "rapid facial events reveal veridical differences in the physical and 
social power of children and adults" (p. 149) and argued that "perceptions 
of power were grounded in the patterns of motion that characterised the 
displays, rather than derived from an inferential process mediated by age 
labelling" (p. 149). She suggested that properties of an individual 
structures the information available in the ambient array and that such 
structure provides meaning to other individuals. Mather and West (1993) 
determined that participants could accurately identify various animals by 
their biological motion as viewed in point-light displays. Stoffgren and 
Flynn (1994) assessed sensitivity to the deformability of support surfaces 
and demonstrated that "this sensitivity can be based solely on kinematic 
stimulation" (p. 33). They argued it is possible to "present second-party 
stimulation to observers that is both natural and solely kinematic" (p. 37). 
It is clear that research to date supports the use of point-light 
displays as a method of isolating the contribution of kinematic information 
in specifying the dynamics of events. Such a method has some obvious 
characteristics that make it especially appropriate for the study of social 
perception. Firstly, point-light displays can provide control over events 
(either real or simulated). Researchers can either isolate particular actions 
or simulate specific events in a controlled environment. According to 
Good (1986) point-light displays can provide informational support for 
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even rather subtle properties. Secondly, by controlling the number and/ or 
placement of lights the researcher has control over a measurable amount as 
well as the location of information. Thirdly, variation of number and/ or 
placement provides the researcher a technique to identify and isolate 
particular patterns of motion with particular specificational properties. 
Finally, point-light displays provide a possible technique to isolate 
parameters of information that inform perceivers by using situations in 
which those parameters may be manipulated or isolated in a controlled 
manner (Berry & Misovich, 1994). 
Although research to date suggests the application of point-light 
displays exhibits usefulness for the study of the social events, there are also 
suggestions some constraints may need to be placed on their usage (Good, 
1986,1987; Runeson & Frykholm, 1983). It has been suggested that the 
subtractiveness of point-light displays can pose problems (Good, 1986). To 
date there has been little research to determine what information can be 
subtracted without reducing the informativeness of the displays. For 
example, when does kinematic facial information need to be included in 
displays as opposed to whole-body kinematics only, or the other way 
around? When information from whole-body displays is not enough to 
allow for accurate identification of an event, do perceivers then actively 
search for and attend to other information, such as facial movement, to 
make such identifications? Is it possible that perceivers firstly attend to 
whole-body kinematics to identify events, and if that information is not 
available or inadequate they then attend to facial information? Could 
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there be an order to information pick-up when identifying social events? 
This study examined the accuracy of participants to identify the nature of 
dyadic events when presented with a whole-body kinematic only display 
of dyadic events compared to a full-view version of the same events 
(where all visual information, including facial information was available) 
and tried to discover if whole-body displays are adequate for examining 
all dyadic social events. 
Differences between sexes 
Most research into the proficiency of perceivers to accurately 
acquire kinematic information from dynamic events has shown few 
significant differences between males and females. However, recent 
research by Bernieri, Davis, Rosenthal and Knee (1994) suggested this issue 
may be in need of further investigation. Using a quantised display, they 
measured the relative movement coordination occurring within dyadic 
social interaction (i.e., interactional synchrony). Bernieri et al. found very 
high correlations between synchrony ratings made from normal video 
displays and those made from quantised mosaic displays. They also 
established that interactional synchrony was "positively correlated with 
interactant rapport reported by females but not with the rapport reported 
by males"(p. 308). 
Research has also described females as more interpersonally 
oriented and expressive than males (Spence, Deaux, & Helmreich, 1985) 
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and generally more accurate than males at nonverbal behaviour perception 
(Hall, 1984). Bernieri et al. concluded that "the combined effect of greater 
interpersonal orientation and superior nonverbal sensitivity may make 
females more susceptible than males to the social consequences of 
interactional synchrony"(p. 308). Research suggests that females attend to 
more interpersonal information available in dyadic social events than do 
males. This effect supported earlier findings by Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, 
Rogers, and Archer (1979) who reported that females are more attuned 
than males to expressive information, however they did not define the 
nature of the information to which females might be more attentive. 
Smith, Archer, and Costanzo (1991) suggested perceivers are aware 
of nonverbal information and are sensitive as to when they are using such 
information accurately. They reported that females have the ability to be 
more sensitive to the specificational nature of the stimulation available in 
social events than their male counterparts and that they are more adept 
than males in attending to nonverbal information. When viewed from an 
ecological perspective, the perceiver picks up the information specifying 
the nature of a social event directly, and neither conscious or unconscious 
processing of that information may be required. 
However, to date, there has been little other empirical evidence to 
suggest differences between females and males in the attention to and the 
pick-up of salient kinematic information inherent in movement of 
individuals involved in social interactivity. This study looked for 
differences existing between the sexes and their sensitivity to 
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transformations in the optic array specifying the nature of dyadic social 
events. 
Summary 
Johansson (1973) reported that motion patterns have been found to 
ncarry all the essential information needed for immediate visual 
identification" (p. 210) of human motion. He suggested that it is not 
previous learning about motion patterns which determine the perception 
of walking, for example, but that the "highly mechanical, automatic type of 
visual data" (p. 210) that is most important. This supported the contention 
within direct theory that transformations in the optic array are the 
information specifying motion events. As argued by Runeson and 
Frykholm (1983) if the "detailed kinematic pattern is specific to an active 
and acting person's anatomical make-up and to the working of his or her 
motor control system" (p. 585), then information is therefore potentially 
available about properties of that individual including "gender, identity, 
expectations, intentions, and what the person is in fact doing" (p. 585). If 
information about the dynamics of an event is available in the kinematics 
to perceivers with direct sensitivity to that information, then it could be 
that such person properties previously considered internal or hidden may 
also be specified in the dynamic kinematics of event perception. That is, 
aspects of traits, emotions, and dispositions, may be kinematically 
specified and perceivers may be sensitive to such structure in the ambient 
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array, not requiring inferential processing to be able to identify them. 
This notion of sensitivity to structure in the ambient array explains 
how direct identification of simple and complex informational invariants 
is possible without the cognitive requirement of computation and/ or 
representation. Relating to the field of social psychology, the KSD 
principle allows for the rejection of the supposition that person properties 
are hidden and therefore only recognised through a causal process of 
registering behaviour and then attributing possible internal or external 
causes for such behaviour (Alley, 1990; Berry, 1988; Good, 1986; McArthur 
& Baron, 1983; Runeson, 1985,1988,1990,1994; Runeson & Frykholm, 
1981,1983; Smith & Ginsburg, 1989; Valenti & Good, 1991). 
Evidence suggests that in perceiving events individuals do not see 
movements as such, but are able to pick-up the structure specifying the 
dynamics underlying the movements. According to Smith and Ginsburg 
(1989) mounting evidence suggests that socially produced stimulation 
nested within social events is extremely rich in information (Becklen, 1985; 
Berry, 1990a, 1990b; Berry & McArthur, 1986; Berry & Finch Wero, 1993; 
Runeson & Frykholm, 1983). Research on event perception has isolated 
some of these high-order, invariant patterns in human movement and 
shown that they effectively specify properties of human action and 
interaction, various characteristics of the actors involved, and particular 
behaviours. These patterns are directly detectable by human observers 
who are attentive to them. As Gibson (1979) proposed, "an understanding 
of life with one's fellow creatures depends on an adequate description of 
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what these creatures offer and then on an analysis of how these offerings 
are perceived" (p. 42). Such a theory directly challenges cognitive models 
of social and causal perception that presume the nonspecificity of input 
(Smith & Ginsburg, 1989). 
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Experiment: The Kinematic Specification of 
Simulated Dyadic Social Interactions Using Point-
Light Displays 
Introduction 
The following of experiment took an ecological approach to 
examine the ability of perceivers to accurately identify the nature of three 
dyadic events from the dynamic kinematics inherent in such events, and 
tested the usefulness of point-light displays for such an endeavour. Based 
upon the arguments discussed, the following predictions were made: 
(1) Participants exposed to both full-visual and kinematic only 
information will be able to make accurate identifications of three 
simulated dyadic events at acceptable levels. Those levels have 
been set at better than chance in the forced-choice condition (33%), 
and better than 40% in the free-verbal condition. This level of 40% 
accurate identification has been arbitrarily set as it requires 
participants in the free-verbal response condition to be more 
accurate than but not significantly above the chance levels of 33% 
for the forced-choice conditions. 
(2) Participants in the whole-body kinematic viewing condition will 
make significantly fewer accurate identifications of dyadic events 
than participants exposed to the full-view version of events. 
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(3) Vigorousness of gestural animation will have an effect on the 
frequency of accurate identifications of the simulated dyadic events 
in the kinematic only condition with participants making more 
accurate identifications of the more vigorous events. 
(4) If attunement increases specificity, then participants provided 
only three choices prior to viewing in a forced-choice identification 
task (each choice representing one of the three dyadic events) will 
make significantly more accurate identifications of dyadic events 
with repeated exposures to the same events. 
(5) If perceptual learning takes place across trials, then participants 
will make more accurate identifications with repeated exposure to 
the simulated dyadic events. 
(6) Females will be more adept than males at identifying the nature 




This study adopted a 3 (dyadic event: E1/E2/E3) x 2 (viewing 
condition: full-visual (FF)/kinematic only (KO)) x 3 (response condition: 
free-verbal (FV)/forced-choice 1 (FCl)/forced-choice 2 (FC2)) x 2 (event 
tape: St1/St2) x 2 (sex: male/female) x 2 (direction of entry of actors: male 
entry right (DR)/male entry left (DL)) experimental design (see Table 1). 
Table 1. 
The 3 x 2 x 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 experimental design. 
Events x 
(3) X 
Event 1 (El) 
Event 2 (E2) 




Full Visual (FF) 
Kinematic Only 
(KO) 









Event x Sex x Directions 
Tapes of Entry 





F Male Right 
(DR) 
M Male Left 
(DL) 
All interactions were recorded in the large television production 
studio at the New Zealand Broadcasting School, Christchurch, New 
Zealand. A television lighting expert was used to ensure that placement of 
studio lighting provided optimum recording quality for each condition. 
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Actors were filmed using a Hitachi Z31 Computacam and recorded on a 
JVC BR-5605EB video cassette recorder. Editing was conducted using a 
National AG-A650 Editing Controller, two National AG6500 video cassette 
recorders, and two Philips, 14-inch colour display monitors. 
The full-view (FF) condition was videotaped under normal studio 
lighting conditions with a neutral, tannish-grey curtain behind the actors. 
Actors wore neutral, dark clothing and all jewellery or other items that 
might be distracting were removed. 
The kinematic only condition (KO) events were videotaped using 
techniques very similar to those utilised by Johansson (1973) and Runeson 
and Frykholm (1981, 1983). High-grade, industrial, silver reflective tape 
was used for the reflective patches. To ensure visibility of the point-lights, 
actors movements were side-on only at all times. Reflective patches were 
40 mm in diameter and placed only on the side of the body nearest the 
camera. Eight reflective patches were placed as follows on each actor: just 
above the ear, neck, shoulder, hip, knee, ankle, elbow, and wrist. A black 
curtain was draped behind the actors to provide a darkened background 
in contrast to the reflective tape. Actors wore dark clothing and dark 
make-up was applied to the actor's faces and hands to ensure no reflectant 
leakage occurred from bright areas of skin. Lighting was in front, above, 
below and on both sides of the actors to ensure an even light distribution 
to reflective patches. When recordings were viewed by participants, the 
displays appeared as a configuration of bright spots against a black 
background. 
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Two recordings were made of each dyadic event, one with the 
female entering from screen right, the male from screen left, and the other 
with the entrance directions reversed. To control for the distance between 
the actors, they were instructed that for each simulation they were to walk 
to specified points marked on the floor with green tape. These marks were 
exactly 800mm apart. To control for speed of approach, actors were 
instructed to walk toward each other at a constant speed for each 
interaction. Any trials where the experimenter or the television consultant 
did not believe the actors either achieved their marks or maintained a 
constant approach speed were terminated and re-recorded. In a further 
effort to control possible variance between individual actors, the same 
actors were used for all recordings. The actors were both of medium build 
with the female and male 1.70 and 1.75 meters in height and 20 and 21 
years of age respectively. In post-production, each simulation was edited 
to a duration of 12 seconds. For all recordings, camera placement 
remained constant at 4m from the actors. 
The dyadic events 
The three dyadic events were as follows; 
(El) good friends meeting after not seeing one another for 
several weeks, 
(E2) good friends meeting as they do several times every day, 
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(E3) good friends meeting after having had an argument earlier in 
the day. 
The actors were given the following instructions prior to the 
recording of each event: 
El: You are good friends but have not seen one another for 
several weeks. You are meeting in the hallway at the 
university prior to a class. You are very happy to see your 
friend again and when you meet, you are to lean towards one 
another, hold hands, and kiss each other briefly on the cheek. 
Then stand back with both feet on your marks and release 
hands. You are to then chat in an animated, excited fashion 
making both hand and head gestures of a relatively excited, 
friendly, and expansive nature. Ensure that such gestures are 
made with your hands nearest the camera. Continue until I 
say 'cut'. 
E2: You are good friends who spend a lot of time together and 
meet everyday for coffee or a chat. You are meeting in the 
hallway at the university prior to a class. While you are 
happy to see one another, it is no big occasion. You are to 
smile at one another and chat in an animated fashion as good 
friends would do. You are to make small, infrequent hand 
and head gestures, and refrain from making larger, more 
exaggerated movements. Ensure that any such gestures are 
made with your hands nearest the camera. Continue until I 
say 'cut'. 
E3: You are good friends meeting in the hallway at the university 
prior to a class. Earlier in the day you had a disagreement 
about some money that is owing and that feeling is still quite 
strong. The female is still angry about the situation while the 
male is feeling a bit guilty. Consequently, upon meeting, the 
female is to adopt an aggressive hands on hips pose and tell 
the male that she is still mad at him, while the male is to 
avoid eye contact by looking downwards and is to bring his 
hand nearest the camera to his chin and cross his other arm 
over his chest in a closed, defensive, submissive posture. The 
female is to discuss the issue of the money owing in an 
aggravated fashion and the male is to maintain the 
submissive pose until I say 'cut'. 
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Dyadic events were recorded in the following order; El, E2 then E3. 
As this study explores the effects of available visual information on 
judgemental accuracy, no audio was made available to participants. 
Procedure 
Participants viewed the simulated dyadic event recordings 
individually in a secluded, darkened room. A 14-inch Phillips monitor 
was used to display the events. In the kinematic only condition (KO), 
contrast was increased and brightness decreased on the monitor to ensure 
no leakage from reflections that may have occurred in the original 
recording of events. Playback was on a National NV-8500 Video Cassette 
Recorder located behind the participants and close to the experimenter. 
Audio recordings of the free-verbal responses were made on a Marantz 
Cassette Recorder using a small, unobtrusive lapel microphone. 
Participants were instructed to carefully read the instruction sheet 
provided (see Appendix A) and then carefully read and sign the consent 
form (see Appendix B). 
The experiment was in two parts. In part one participants' free-
verbal responses were recorded and in part two they were required to 
make a choice from the three alternatives provided (Appendix C). 
In part one, the experimenter explained to the participants; 
This is a task involving visual information. You are about to watch 
some video tapes of interactions between two people. The 
interactions may or may not be the same. The event will last for 12 
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seconds. At the end of that time I will ask you to tell me the nature 
of the interaction and relationship between the two people; in other 
words, what you think is going on between these two people, not 
just what movements you see. If you have no idea of what you 
think is going on, it is important to say so. You will have as long as 
you need to respond and I will record your answers on a cassette 
recorder for coding later. There will be six video clips for you to 
view and we will start now. 
Participants then viewed each of the three dyadic events as 
videotaped from each direction for a total of six presentations. Responses 
were recorded for coding later. 
In part two, the experimenter provided participants with an answer 
sheet (Appendix C) and provided the following instructions; 
I will now show you the same interactions randomly 
presented. You will be asked to make a choice from those 
provided as to the nature of the interaction you are viewing. 
The choices are the same for each interaction. Please take a 
moment to acquaint yourself with the three choices. Please 
record your answers on the answer sheet provided with a 
tick next to your choice. Each video clip is 12 seconds long, 
and you will have a further 8 seconds after the event has 
finished in which to record your answer before the next 
interaction appears. However, please feel free to mark your 
answer sooner if you think you are sure of your response. 
Participants then viewed the tape of the dyadic events. Responses were 
recorded on the answer sheets and collected at the end of each session. 
Each trial lasted approximately 12 minutes. 
Tapes were arranged to control for presentation effects by dividing 
the six presentations into two blocks and placing the following constraints 
on order of presentation (see Table 2): 
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(a) no two dyadic events could be sequential, 
(b) no more than two dyadic event directions could be 
sequential, 
(c) each of the six dyadic events must appear in each block. 
Table 2. 
Order of presentation by event and direction of entry. 
Trial Block I Block II 
1 El DL E3DR 
2 E3DR El DL 
3 E2DR E2DL 
4 E3DL El DR 
5 E2DL E3DL 
6 El DR E2DR 
The two presentation blocks were balanced by creating two event tapes 
(see Table 3). 
Table 3. 













The design resulted in a total of 18 trials per participant. 
At the conclusion of each session, participants were asked if they 
were happy for their responses to be used and any questions the 
participants had were answered by the experimenter. No participants 
chose to withdraw their responses. 
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Participants 
The 48 participants who volunteered to participate, 24 female and 
24 male, were students at either the Christchurch Polytechnic or the 
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Results 
Coding of Free-Verbal (FV) Responses 
Three coders (two female and one male drawn from the same 
population) were supplied with an answer sheet (see Table 4) and asked to 
listen to the free-verbal responses of each participant for each trial. They 
recorded their responses on the sheet next to the choice they believed most 
accurately represented the participant's response on each trial. Coders 
were not aware of any other aspects of the study. It was necessary for at 
least two of the three coders responses to match in order to give that 
participant's response a mark. If at least two out of the three coders 
responses matched, then that match was marked as the response given by 
the participant. All three coders responses matched 58% of the time, with 
responses by coders one and two matching 73%, coders one and three 68% 
and coders two and three 66%. Since at least two of the three coders had 
matching responses on all trials, it was not necessary to resolve any 
discrepancies between coders. 
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Table 4. 





_ good friends meeting after not seeing one another for 
several weeks. 
_ good friends meeting as they do several times every 
day. 
_ good friends meeting after having had an argument 
earlier in the day. 
none of the above. 
did not know. 
Data reduction and tests for accuracy 
Firstly, for analysis of raw data, exact participant responses for each 
trial were entered into a spreadsheet. Proportions of accurate 
identifications for each of the three dyadic events by direction of entry, 
viewing condition, and response condition were calculated (see Tables 5, 6, 
and 7). Forced-choice responses were pooled as no differences were found 
between the two forced-choice conditions (see page 75). 
In the forced-choice conditions participants were required to select 
one of three possible answers resulting in a chance level of .33. Due to the 




Proportion of accurate identifications for El by direction of entry of the male actor 
by response and viewing conditions. 
Free Verbal (FV) Forced-Choice (FCl +2) 
Participant Direction Full Visual Kinematic Full Visual Kinematic 
Response of Entry (FF) Only (KO) (FF) Only (KO) 
El DL .71 .63 .83 .52 
DR .25 .50 .96 .92 
E2 DL .21 .38 .17 .42 
DR .54 .46 .04 .04 
E3 DL .04 .00 .00 .06 
DR .00 .00 .00 .04 
None Above DL .04 .00 
DR .21 .02 
Don't Know DL .00 .00 
DR .00 .00 
Table 6. 
Proportion of accurate identifications for E2 by direction of entry of the male actor 
by response and viewing conditions. 
Free Verbal (FV) Forced-Choice (FCl +2) 
Participant Direction Full Visual Kinematic Full Visual Kinematic 
Response of Entry (FF) Only (KO) (FF) Only (KO) 
El DL .13 .00 .06 .02 
DR .04 .04 .00 .08 
E2 DL .63 .29 .94 .52 
DR .63 .29 1.00 .71 
E3 DL .00 .17 .00 .46 
DR .00 .17 .00 .21 
None Above DL .21 .38 
DR .25 .29 
Don't Know DL .04 .17 
DR .08 .17 
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Table 7. 
Proportion of accurate identifications for E3 by direction of entry of the male actor 
by response and viewing conditions. 
Free Verbal (FV) Forced-Choice (FCl +2) 
Participant Direction Full Visual Kinematic Full Visual Kinematic 
Response of Entry (FF) Only (KO) (FF) Only (KO) 
El DL .00 .00 .00 .00 
DR .00 .00 .00 .00 
E2 DL .04 .08 .00 .21 
DR .04 .25 .00 .17 
E3 DL .79 .33 1.00 .79 
DR .67 .58 1.00 .83 
None Above DL .08 .50 
DR .29 .17 
Don't Know DL .08 .08 
DR .04 .00 
Table 8 reports proportion of accurate identifications for each of the 
three dyadic events in both the free-verbal and forced-choice response 
conditions. In the free-verbal condition, only participants attempting to 
identify the more neutral E2 dyadic event in the kinematic only condition 
failed to achieve a proportion of accuracy better than .40. 
Table 8. 
Proportion of accurate identifications by viewing/response conditions for each 
event. 
Event Full Visual Kinematic Only X 
Free Verbal Forced-Choice Free Verbal Forced-Choice 
(FV) (FCl + FC2) (FV) (FCl + FC2) 
El .48 .90 .56 .72 .67 
E2 .63 .97 .30 .61 .48 
E3 .73 1.00 .46 .81 .75 
X .61 .96 .44 .71 
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Chi-square analysis of frequency of identification for observed 
responses versus frequency levels expected due to chance in the forced-
choice response condition was significant (X2 (2)=643.51, p<0.01). Further 
chi-square analyses of forced-choice responses by dyadic event in each 
viewing condition showed that participants were able to identify all three 
dyadic events in both viewing conditions at better than chance levels (see 
Table 9). 
Table 9. 
Chi-square results for forced-choice responses by viewing condition compared to 
chance. 
Full-Visual Condition Kinematic Only Condition 
x2 df p-value x2 df p-value 
El 136.6875 1 < 0.01 El 64.1714 1 < 0.01 
E2 174.4219 1 < 0.01 E2 34.1719 1 < 0.01 
E3 192.0000 1 < 0.01 E3 99.1875 1 < 0.01 
Responses for dyadic event by viewing condition by direction of 
entry revealed a discrepancy between direction-left and direction-right for 
El that was not apparent for the other two dyadic events (see Tables 5-7). 
For example, proportion of accurate identifications for El in the free-verbal 
response condition was .71 for direction-left (DL) but only .25 for 
direction-right (DR) (see Table 5) while differences between directions 
were minimal for E2 and E3. A similar discrepancy arose in the forced-
choice responses for El, only this time in the kinematic only viewing 
condition. In the kinematic- only /forced-choice condition, proportion of 
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accurate identifications for El was .52 for direction-left (DL) and .92 for 
direction-right (DR), a reversal of the free-verbal results (see Table 5). 
Again, differences in proportion of accurate identifications in this 
condition for E2 and E3 were minimal. Such results suggested that either 
(a) the two El simulations (DL and DR) were in some way different from 
one another (i.e., they were not identical simulations), or (b) participants 
differed in their perceptions of the event depending upon the direction of 
entry of the actors in the simulations. This second possibility seemed least 
likely as the same effect was not apparent in either of the two other 
simulations. Furthermore, there was no consistency in participants' 
responses between viewing conditions. The proportion of accurate 
identifications for participants in the full-visual/ free-verbal condition were 
the reverse of those in the kinematic only /forced-choice condition. If there 
was a difference in direction of entry (left or right) it would be expected to 
be consistent across both viewing conditions. This was clearly not the case. 
A visual review of the recorded events by the experimenter confirmed 
minor differences in movements between the two simulations for El by 
direction of entry. Although the differences did not appear major, it was 
certainly possible that even such minor variations in movement patterns 
could have accounted for the irregularity of results. In particular, for 
El/DR in the full-visual simulation, the actors appeared to stand slightly 
behind their marks requiring them to lean further towards one another to 
kiss when compared to the El/DL full-visual simulation. This may have 
resulted in the discrepancy in proportion of accurate identifications for El 
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by direction of entry in the full-visual condition which was not apparent 
for the other dyadic events. The importance of the 'distance between' 
actors will be discussed more fully later (see pages 96-98). It appeared 
that direction of entry results for El may have been confounded by a lack 
of similarity between El/DR and El/DL, particularly in the full-visual 
condition. It was assumed the results for El was therefore not a function 
of direction of entry of the actors and for this reason, directions of entry 
were pooled over for the remaining analyses . 
However, despite some apparent problems with El, it was still 
apparent, as expected, that participants were able to accurately identify the 
nature of the three simulated dyadic events at better than chance levels in 
the kinematic only/ forced-choice conditions, and that participants were 
able to identify at least two of the three dyadic events in the free-verbal 
response condition, with levels of accuracy above 40%. 
Tests for effects 
As a second method for treating data, participants' responses were 
marked '1' if they correctly identified the simulated dyadic event and 'O' if 
they identified something other than the event viewed. Responses were 
entered into Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) with within-participant 
variables nested by event, direction of entry, and response condition. 
Between-participant variables were event tape, sex, and viewing condition. 
Proportions of accurate identifications were calculated for each condition 
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for further analysis. 
Analysis of variance of the 3 (dyadic event: El/E2/E3) x 2 (viewing 
condition: FF /KO) x 3 (response condition: FV /FC1/FC2) x 2 (event tape: 
Stl/St2) x 2 (sex: male/female) factorial design (pooling over direction of 
entry) showed significant main effects for response condition 
(F(2,863)=51.32, p < 0.05), dyadic event (F (2,863)=5.16, p<0.01), and 
viewing condition (F(l,863)=52.51, p<0.01), and a significant interaction 
between level of dyadic event and viewing condition (F(2,863)=15.27, p < 
0.01). No other significant results were found. 
A post hoc multiple comparison test (Tukey's Studentised Range 
(HSD) Test) for response condition (FV /FC1/FC2) showed no significant 
difference between proportions of accurate identifications between FCl 
and FC2, but participants' proportion of accurate identifications in the FV 
condition was significantly lower than both forced-choice conditions 
(0.823, 0.840, and 0.524 respectively. Tukey's p < 0.01). This result 
supported the hypothesis that participants would identify the nature of the 
dyadic events more frequently in a forced-choice identification task than 
when allowed to provide unrestricted, free-verbal responses. The lack of a 
significant difference between FCl(0.823) and FC2 (0.840) did not support 
the hypothesis that perceptual learning would take place over repeated 
exposure to events. 
The two main effects for dyadic event and viewing condition were 
qualified by the interaction between these two variables. The proportion 
of accurate identifications for levels of simulated dyadic event by viewing 
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condition can be seen in Figure 2. A simple main effects analysis for each 
of the three dyadic events across viewing conditions showed a significant 
difference for E2 only (F(l,863)=262.87, p<0.05). Participants in the full-
visual viewing condition made significantly more accurate identifications 
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Figure 1. Proportion of accurate identifications for event type by viewing 
condition. 
A simple main effects analysis for events applied to the two viewing 
conditions showed significant results for both viewing conditions; full-
visual (F(2,863)=284.76, p=<0.05) and kinematic only (F(2,863)=186.20, 
p<0.05). A post hoc Tukey's Studentised Range (HSD) Test for significance 
was conducted for each of the viewing conditions. Results showed that in 
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the full-visual viewing condition participants made significantly more 
accurate identifications of E3 than of El (0.903 and 0.760 respectively, 
Tukey's p<0.01). Results in the kinematic only viewing condition indicated 
that participants made significantly more accurate identifications of E3 and 
of El than of E2 (0.688, 0.667, and 0.514 respectively, Tukey's p<0.01). No 
other significant differences were found. 
Results showed that the interaction between dyadic event and 
viewing condition was due to the differences in accuracy for E2 between 
viewing conditions. The lack of a significant difference by viewing 
condition for El and E3 does not support the prediction that participants 
would make more accurate identifications in the full-visual as compared to 
kinematic only viewing conditions for all dyadic events. This was only 
apparent for E2. 
Results did support the second hypothesis that more vigourous 
gestural animation would result in increased accuracy of identification in 
the kinematic only condition. Both El and E3 appeared far more 
gesturally animated (i.e., there was more apparent bodily motion 
involved) than E2 (with visibly less movement apparent when compared 
to El and E3) and proportions of accurate identifications were significantly 
higher for El and E3 than for E2. However, level of gestural animation 
did not explain the significant difference between E3 and El in the full-




This thesis took an ecological approach to determine whether 
perceivers could identify the nature of dyadic events from the kinematic 
information available in the ambient array, and tested the usefulness of 
point-light displays for such an endeavour. It was hypothesised that 
although participants would be able to accurately identify all three dyadic 
events at acceptable levels in both viewing conditions, the reductive nature 
of point-light displays using whole-body kinematics would result in 
participants in the full-visual viewing condition (where all the visual 
information was available) making significantly more accurate 
identifications than those in the kinematic only viewing condition. This 
prediction was supported for only one of the three dyadic events under 
investigation and on the whole. 
It was further suggested that events with high levels of gestural 
animation (El and E3) would be easier to identify than the more gesturally 
neutral E2 in the kinematic only viewing condition. This prediction found 
support as participants in the kinematic only condition identified the 
gesturally more animated El and E3 significantly more often than they 
identified the less gesturally vigorous E2. 
It was anticipated that the proportion of accurate identifications for 
participants in the forced-choice conditions would be higher than those in 
the free-verbal condition, possibly due to attunement of the perceptual 
system. Results showed that participants in the forced-choice condition 
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did make significantly more accurate identifications of all three dyadic 
events than those in the free-verbal response condition. 
The prediction that perceptual learning would take place over 
repeated exposure to events found no support from the results of this 
study. There was no significant difference between the two forced-choice 
conditions. 
Finally, it was anticipated that females would exhibit higher levels 
of accuracy across all conditions than males. Again, no support was 
evident for this hypothesis. Males and females showed no significant 
differences across any of the test conditions. 
Accuracy of identification of dyadic events 
In the forced-choice condition participants' frequency of 
identifications for all three dyadic events was above chance for both 
viewing conditions. This result held for each of the six event-by-viewing-
condition combinations as well with the proportion of accurate 
identifications of dyadic events reaching very high levels for some dyadic 
events, particularly in the full-visual viewing condition. Results indicated 
that participants in both viewing conditions were able to make accurate 
identifications of each dyadic event when required to make a forced-choice 
identification of dyadic events. 
As participants were provided no information about the nature of 
the dyadic events prior to or during the free-verbal response condition, 
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and the fact that any possible response was available to them in the free-
verbal response condition, no comparisons of frequency of identification 
compared to chance were available. Instead, an identification proportion 
over .40 was determined as acceptable in this condition. This level of 
accurate identification required participants in this response condition to 
be more accurate than but not significantly above the chance levels of 33% 
for the forced-choice conditions. Participants identified the simulated 
dyadic events in the free-verbal response condition with an overall 
accuracy of 53%. Accurate identifications by viewing condition was also 
above the acceptable level, 62% and 44% in the full-visual and kinematic 
only conditions respectively. Results supported the prediction that 
participants would be able to accurately identify the nature of the 
simulated dyadic events in both the free-verbal and forced-choice response 
conditions and that overall the simulated dyadic events adequately 
depicted the nature of the desired dyadic events. However, although 
overall levels of accuracy were acceptable, these results needed further 
explanation with reference to those found for levels of viewing condition, 
response condition, dyadic event, and the interactions between dyadic 
event and viewing condition. Differences were expected and found. 
Accuracy by viewing condition and dyadic event 
Participants in the full-view condition made more accurate 
identifications of E2 than participants in the kinematic only viewing 
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condition. The suggestion that participants in the full-visual condition 
would make significantly more accurate identifications of all three dyadic 
events than those exposed to kinematic only information was not 
supported in this study for El and E3. There was enough information 
available in both viewing conditions for participants in each viewing 
condition to make similar levels of identifications of El and E3. However, 
results suggested that for E2, participants in the full-visual condition 
attended to information that was either not available, not attended to, or 
inadequate for participants in the kinematic only condition. It appears that 
whole-body kinematics were inadequate in accurately specifying the 
nature of E2. 
Just why El and E3 were identified more frequently than E2 in the 
kinematic only viewing condition became apparent when differences 
between dyadic events were examined across viewing conditions. As 
expected, the more gesturally animated events (El and E3) were identified 
more accurately than the more neutral event (E2) in the kinematic only 
viewing condition, while no differences were found in the full-visual 
condition between E2 and either El or E3. This result supported the 
arguments of Runeson and Frykholm (1983) and Runeson (1985, 1990, 
1994, 1995) that vigorousness of gestural animation increases specificity 
and has an effect on a perceiver's ability to identify events when viewing 
kinematic only information. Such a result again suggested that important 
information necessary for participants to make accurate assessments of E2 
was either not available, not attended to, or inadequate in the kinematic 
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only condition. This finding, and those mentioned above, suggest that 
usefulness of point-light displays in the study of dyadic events might have 
to be limited to events with relatively high levels of gestural vigorousness. 
It appeared that when gestural animation was low, participants in the full-
visual viewing condition used information that was either not available, 
not attended to, or inadequate when presented in whole-body kinematic 
presentations. This possibility will be discussed in detail later (see pages 
88-90 and 93-95). 
One finding that was not expected was the significant difference in 
accuracy of identification between E3 and El in the full-view condition, 
with participants making more accurate identifications of E3 than El. No 
differences were found between El and E2 or E2 and E3 in this viewing 
condition. It appeared this result may have been due to possible 
experimental design problems, particularly with reference to El 
simulations (see pages 96-98 for a detailed discussion). 
Attunement 
This study lent qualified support to the argument that attunement 
would lead to more accurate identifications of the three dyadic events. 
Participants in the forced-choice conditions made significantly more 
identifications of the simulated dyadic events than they did in the free-
verbal condition. It appeared that by attuning their perceptual system to 
search for invariants specifying a limited number of possible dyadic 
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events, and then asking them to perform an identification task, participants 
did significantly better than those in the unrestricted, free-verbal response 
condition. In other words, educating the participant's attention by 
providing them with the three possible dyadic events resulted in more 
accurate identifications. This result supported the argument that 
perception in the forced-choice condition was task specific; the task the 
perceiver was performing interacted with the available information to 
effect strategies of perceiving as well as what was perceived. In the forced-
choice conditions, information detection was controlled and attunement 
was achieved through the narrowing down of the possible social invariants 
to which participants needed to attend to just the three available choices. 
The findings supported E.J. Gibson's (1969) argument that adaptive 
modification of perception results in a better correlation between the 
information available and the events being viewed, and supported the 
hypothesis that when attention was educated perceivers would be more 
capable of picking up the information necessary to accurately identify the 
nature of the simulated dyadic events. 
However, for such an argument to be acceptable, the position of 
researchers such as Gamer (1962) needs to be overcome. He proposed that 
if participants are aware of the set of alternatives in a task, then they are 
also aware of (1) the possibilities that could be presented, and (2) what 
responses are possible and permissible. Garner argued response 
discrimination and choice was a "critical factor in any perceptual 
experiment" (p. 38), and concluded that the degree and nature of the choice 
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of responses was probably more important than the nature of the stimuli. 
In other words, it could be possible that the critical factor in the 
participants' performance was not due to the restriction in stimuli, but in 
the accompanying restriction in possible responses. For this experiment 
proponents of response uncertainty theories would argue that the higher 
levels of accuracy in the forced-choice conditions were due to the 
reduction in possible responses as opposed to the attunement of the 
perceptual system. 
At this point, the use of the word 'information' requires elaboration. 
Garner tended to consider information in the Shannon and Weaver (1949) 
and Attneave (1954, 1959) sense of 'bits\ hence the view that information 
was a measure of uncertainty. However, the ecological view is that 
structure in the ambient array is the information available to a perceiver 
able to attend to it. Gibson (1966) considered information in the sense of 
specificity to something, not as a reduction in uncertainty. Information 
then is the means by which events are perceived, not simply sensory 
impressions (i.e., 'bits'). In other words, events are perceived and 
information is ordinarily transparent to perception. If one takes a direct 
approach to perception, that perceivers can and do directly detect 
information in the ambient array that is structured and is informative in its 
own right, then Garner's argument is not an appropriate one. This 
difference in the definition of 'information' is a major distinction between 
cognitive and direct perceptual theories. It is interesting to note that in 
1974 Garner appeared to have shifted ground to take a more Gibsonian 
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approach to information stating that "stimulus information, or structure, 
provides meaning and is pertinent to what I would call perception" (p. 2). 
To overcome Garner's original arguments concerning response 
uncertainty, future studies may need to sufficiently control information 
(i.e., to manipulate information independently of responses, such as 
inclusion of a 'dummy' response choice). While this study did not hold 
response uncertainty constant and cannot therefore totally overcome 
Garner's arguments, when viewed from an ecological perspective, the 
results of this study can, at the very least, suggest that attunement could 
result in greater specificity and result in more accurate identifications. 
However, further research is necessary before conclusive arguments can be 
put forward. 
Perceptual Learning 
If, as argued by E.J. Gibson (1969), perceptual learning is the 
increased ability to extract and differentiate progressively finer levels of 
invariant structure in the real world, and perceptual development is a 
outcome of both experience with an environment and maturation of the 
individual in that environment, then one would conclude that the results 
of this study showed no significant support that perceptual learning took 
place over repeated exposure to the simulated dyadic events in the forced-
choice conditions (FCl and FC2). Such a finding was contrary to the 
arguments of E.J. Gibson (1969), McArthur & Baron (1983), and Smith & 
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Ginsburg (1989). 
However, several factors may have effected such a result. Firstly, 
participants were exposed to events in the free-verbal condition prior to 
the forced-choice conditions. Perceptual learning may indeed have taken 
place between these sets of trials, but the experimental design was 
insensitive to it. Secondly, there was a slight increase in overall accuracy 
from the first to the second forced-choice conditions which was worthy of 
note. This increase in accuracy for the second forced-choice condition held 
across all three events as well. Further trials may have resulted in more 
frequent identifications by participants, thus lending support for 
perceptual learning. Thirdly, E.J. Gibson (1969) suggested feedback is an 
important element in perceptual learning. The total lack of feedback in 
this study may have also accounted for no apparent perceptual learning 
across repeated trials. Finally, the proportion of accurate identifications in 
all of the forced-choice conditions was very high for all events, leaving 
little room for improvement. This may have been overcome with a larger 
sample size, more trials, or by using more events with a wider variation in 
interactivity. Further research that (1) keeps the response conditions 
constant, (2) allows for more improvement, (3) provides feedback, (4) 
includes a larger sample size, and (5) provides a wider variety of 
interactions would be better equipped to assess perceptual learning. 
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Sex Differences 
Results of this study did not support the original hypothesis that 
there would be differences between the sexes in their ability to accurately 
identify the nature of the three simulated dyadic social events. 
However, an observation by the experimenter may be worthy of note. 
Although all participants had a reasonable amount of time between trials 
in which to respond, it was observed that females made more rapid 
identifications than did males. As Bernieri et al. (1994) have suggested, the 
"combined effect of greater interpersonal orientation and superior 
nonverbal sensitivity" (p. 308) may make females more sensitive than 
males to information specifying the "social consequences of interactional 
synchrony" (p. 308). If females are indeed more open to such 
consequences, then perhaps they become able to detect the nature of such 
events, if not more accurately than males, then perhaps more rapidly. 
Such a system could have evolutionary significance. A study of reaction 
times between males and females could be of benefit for someone 
interested examining this issue. For example, is there a difference between 
sexes in the amount of time required to pick-up information specifying a 
dangerous or threatening interaction? The addition of a purposeful task, 
like identifying whether the event was threatening or not, could assist in 
determining any differences between males and females. 
Furthermore, Ginsburg and Smith (1993) have suggested male and 
female observers may well have different perspectives in viewing some 
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kinds of cross-sex dyadic social events which could produce a variation in 
the sensitivity to the behaviours being observed. An examination of sex 
differences in terms of amount or type of information necessary to make 
accurate identifications of dyadic events could be useful, as well as 
variations in sensitivity to same-sex and different sex dyadic social events. 
Usefulness of point-light displays 
Results of this study lent some support for the usefulness of point-
light displays in the examination of dyadic social events. Runeson and 
Frykholm (1981, 1983), and Runeson (1985, 1994) argued that with point-
light displays, the phenomenon on the display screen were constrained by 
an event happening beyond the scope of the screen, and when such 
occurrences were made available to observers, they were fertile and, at 
times, complex samples of real-life human kinematics. However, this 
study suggested that making that information available to perceivers can 
be troublesome and caution needs to be taken when presenting whole-
body kinematics in point-light displays to study social events. 
Specificity and whole-body kinematics 
While the whole-body point-light displays used in this study 
appeared to provide a method for providing information specifying the 
nature of some dyadic events, it did not appear to adequately do so for all 
events. The differences in accuracy of identification between full-visual 
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and kinematic only viewing conditions for E2 suggested that at least some 
of the information specifying this event to participants was either not 
apparent, not attended to, or inadequate in the whole-body point-light 
displays. Such a finding strengthens the argument of Runeson and 
Frykholm (1983) and others (Berry, 1990a,b, 199la,b; Berry & McArthur, 
1986; Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988; Berry & Finch Wero, 1993) that 
bodily kinematics may be only some of the information for veridical 
perception of events. In this study, several participants in the free-
verbal/ full-visual condition noted that in E2 the actors were "smiling", 
suggesting they "knew one another" or were "happy to see each other". It 
appeared that by not including the kinematic facial information in the 
point-light displays, important information for identifying the nature of 
the less gesturally animated E2 was not available to participants with a 
corresponding reduction in accuracy levels. For less gesturally animated 
events like E2, point-light displays may need to include additional sources 
of information, such as facial motion and/ or increased bodily information. 
Certainly facial information has been shown to be informative. 
Berry and Finch Wero (1993) suggested that there were lawful connections 
between certain aspects of facial appearance and certain dispositional 
characteristics, and that "social perceivers are sensitive to these 
covariations" (p. 499). They showed that people were able to predict with 
some accuracy a target person's social dominance, interpersonal warmth, 
and honesty from facial information. Berry (1991a) found that social 
perceivers could detect some dispositional properties of other people on 
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the basis of relatively little information. Nonverbal expressive behaviours, 
such as small facial movements and eye contact, constituted but some of 
the information available to perceivers. Berry suggested that individuals 
may directly express their dispositional properties through such subtle 
facial manipulations. This supported Baron (1990) who found that a 
mother, when interacting with her own child, was clearly picked out as 
being the real mother even when facial movement was quite minimal. 
These findings supported Alley (1988) who suggested that from an 
ecological perspective, facial appearance should influence the 
"psychosocial responses of others as many physical attributes are specific 
to or correlated with certain behavioural tendencies or social affordances" 
(p. 3). 
Again, the inclusion of facial information in the full-visual condition 
of this study provided participants with information not available to those 
in the kinematic only viewing condition. Free-verbal responses suggested 
participants used this information in making identifications of E2 in the 
full-visual viewing condition, thus accounting for at least some of the 
difference in responses between the full-visual and the kinematic only 
conditions. A further study, either masking the facial information in the 
full-visual condition and/ or including kinematic facial information in the 
point-light displays of events, might provide a better understanding of this 
issue. 
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Control of information and available metrics 
The differences found between the full-visual and kinematic only 
viewing conditions for E2 also suggested that the reductive nature of the 
point-light displays in this experiment was irrespective of the 
informativeness of the kinematics, in other words, there was no control 
over what information was taken out in the kinematic only viewing 
condition. Research to date has not been conclusive in specifying which 
parts or properties of point-light displays are of perceptual importance and 
which are not. It appeared that point-light displays entail little or no 
control over the informative kinematics. Berry and Misovich (1994) 
suggested that when examining social interactivity, one must be careful to 
control the information in such a manner as to be able to identify what 
information was necessary to specify the nature of the event. While 
Runeson (1994) concluded that natural point-light displays do provide a 
way of ensuring that the information was there, this was either not 
apparent in this study, or perceivers were not attending to the right 
kinematic information in the ambient array. One could conclude that to 
further the usefulness of point-light displays in the study of social events, 
it is necessary to gain control over the information to be presented and 
isolate the structural invariants with relational specificity to the 
corresponding events. There are several ways this can be accomplished. 
Newtson (1973) found that differences in the size of an action unit 
that was discriminated can produce differences in the subjective 
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information state about an observed person. As Newtson (1990) argued, a 
"sequence of different actions consists of a succession of different 
dynamical systems. Each action requires reorganisation of the body into a 
different coordinative structure" (p. 168) with new specificity to actor and 
observer alike. Newtson, Engquist, and Bois (1977) measured these 
successive reorganisations by assessing the changes in joint angles using 
point-lights. 
Such a technique of successively reducing (or increasing) 
information using point-lights could be one way at getting at the critical 
information for making veridical assessments of dynamic social events. 
Under such procedures, critical points and significant changes in 
frequency of identification of such events would more likely be a function 
of kinematic information (which can be controlled indirectly) than of the 
number of lights (which can be controlled directly but has an indirect 
relation with kinematics). A possible solution lies in manipulating the 
number and order in which lights with different informativeness are 
added. Another is in the possible configurations. For example, Bingham 
(1993) found that the placement of the first two point-lights on the head 
and ankle to specify the vertical extremities of individuals in a lifted-
weight experiment provided enough information for participants to make 
fairly accurate judgements. Earlier, Cutting & Kozlowski (1977) used a 
technique of varying number and configuration of point-lights to find that 
specific patterns of kinematic information specified sex and even 
acquaintanceship between actor and participant. Other appropriate 
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metrics to measure specified amounts of kinematic movement, such as 
changes in joint angles, gross magnitude of optical activity, and/ or total 
distance of specific movements within displays, would assist in 
determining if what Ginsburg & Smith (1993) call 'critical actions' exist and 
where they might exist within the stream of action. Using actors to 
manipulate information in order to gain control over that information may 
be an effective tool in the examination of the kinematic specification of 
social events. By having actors 'over-act' and/ or 'under-act' specified 
social events, isolating particular movements, and using a metric, such as 
one of those mentioned above, kinematic information could be effectively 
controlled, manipulated, and measured. Such techniques would have 
provided a metric for levels of gestural animation (which was absent from 
this study) making measurement of levels of gestural vigorousness a 
controllable variable. Application of appropriate metrics would make 
information a controllable, tractable, measurable variable within the 
context of an ecological approach. Future studies may need to include 
such techniques to identify the relational specificities in the dynamic 
kinematics of social events. 
Whole-body and facial information 
The use of point-light displays may be a good tool in determining 
what information perceivers attend to when identifying social events and 
whether or not attensity (the ecological significance, adaptive value, or 
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probability of being attended to) changes across events and across viewing 
conditions. For example, a study of eye movement and reaction times in 
this experiment would have been useful. By measuring where a 
participant's eyes were focused and where they moved to on the display 
screen across viewing conditions would allow researchers to examine 
correlations of movement between full-visual and kinematic only versions 
of events. Did participants attend to the same information in the same 
order in each viewing condition? When events were varied, did 
participant's eyes start by exploring whole-body kinematics then move to 
facial information to make identifications, or the other way around, or not 
at all? Were there differences in patterns of eye movement by response 
condition? Did patterns of eye movement differ in the forced-choice 
condition when participants were actively searching for invariant structure 
available in the optical array with specificity to one of only three possible 
dyadic events compared to patterns of eye movement in the free-verbal 
condition where they had no information as to what the possibilities might 
have been? Such a technique applied to this study may have shed further 
light on the differences for E2 between the full-visual and kinematic only 
viewing conditions and offered a possible suggestion as to whether or not 
perception of social events is orderly from one source of structure to 
another and the possible direction of that order. Did participant's eye 
movements in the full-visual condition attend to bodily kinematics first 
then move to explore facial information before making an identification, 
and did this pattern of information pick-up for E2 vary from that for El 
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and E3? And what information did participants in the full-view condition 
attend to for El that resulted in less accurate identifications than E3? Such 
a technique could have provided possible answers to such questions. 
By studying reaction times in conjunction with the addition or 
reduction of information in the displays, researchers would have another 
method to assist in determining the level of specificity of the information 
that was either added or subtracted. When critical information was 
removed (or reduced) a corresponding reduction in speed of accurate 
identification should result. The assumption of the researcher in this study 
regarding the observed differences between males and females in the 
speed of identifying the dyadic events could also be tested this way. 
The study of eye movement and reaction times offers some promise 
for further research. Application of suitable metrics and proper research 
design could converge on the critical information available in the ambient 
array and measure specificity of controlled information available to 
perceivers viewing social events. With reference to this experiment, such a 
technique could possibly determine what information participants 
attended to to make accurate identification of events, and whether or not 
there was a difference in attensity of particular information and what 
specificational properties that information had with relation to the event 
being viewed. 
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Use of simulations 
As previously discussed, the use of simulations can be effective 
tools in examining dyadic events by providing ways to gain control of the 
information presented to participants. However, the results of this study 
showed that researchers do need to be cautious of just what is controlled 
when simulating dyadic events. In this study, controlling for the 'distance 
between' actors resulted in a confounding variable being introduced. 
It was suggested previously that the simulations for El were either 
(a) not identical for DL and DR, or (b) did not adequately depict the 
desired dyadic event. As explained in the method section, controls were in 
place during recording to ensure simulations by direction of entry of the 
actors were as identical as possible. However, the reported review of El 
by direction of entry showed a difference between the two simulations in 
the free-verbal condition that may have accounted for the difference in 
results in this condition. This supports the argument that the two 
simulations were not identical with a resultant difference in accurate 
identifications by direction. 
There is also evidence to support the second possibility, that the 
simulations for El did not adequately depict the desired dyadic event. 
Evidence that El did not represent the desired dyadic event as well as E2 
and E3 represented their respective events became evident when a review 
of free-verbal responses and an examination of responses considered 
'inaccurate' was undertaken. Nine of the forty-eight participants in the 
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free-verbal condition commented on the "distance between" the two actors 
in El as influencing their final response. This was apparent across both 
viewing conditions. In fact, several participants actually began their free-
verbal response by identifying El accurately, but then changed their 
responses commenting on the "distance between" actors as the reason. One 
participant commented "it looks like a couple who haven't seen one 
another for a while and are really happy to see each other, but they are 
standing too far apart. I guess they're just friends getting together ..... ". 
Such responses were not evident for the other two dyadic events under 
investigation. 
In each of the instances where participants commented on the 
'distance between' the actors, they identified El as E2. A further review of 
incorrect El answers in both viewing conditions showed that four out of 
five incorrect responses for El identified it as E2 in both the free-verbal 
and forced-choice conditions. It appeared that by controlling for the 
'distance between' the actors when recording the simulated dyadic events, 
a confounding variable was unexpectedly introduced. It must be 
suggested that the 'distance between' the actors was in itself important 
information that participants can and did attend to, and that this 
information had specificational properties which confounded the results of 
this study. 
This result pointed out some of the problems in using actors and 
simulated events for studying social phenomenon. As Berry and Misovich 
concluded, researchers do not have to refrain from using posed or role-
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played events, but they do need to be cautious of conclusions drawn from 
such studies. Indeed, while using actors may not be as ecologically valid 
as using individuals in real-world interactions (Good, 1986; Berry & 
Misovich, 1994) there are suggestions as to how such problems can at least 
be partially overcome. For example, using professional actors in 
simulations could assist in rendering more precise simulations. Hannah, 
Domino, Hanson, and Hannah (1994) suggested that experienced, 
professional actors take on at least some of the personality dimensions of 
the character they were to play, and Berry and Misovich (1994) agreed that 
there are individual differences in the ability to successfully manipulate or 
fake social events. Experienced actors or even some sales people, for 
example, are extremely adept at such practices and would be better than 
novice actors in replicating the desired nature of a social event. Using 
experienced actors in simulations may prove beneficial for future studies. 
However, the greatest potential to overcome the use of simulations appears 
to reside with new computer technology. 
New technology 
New computer technology may give point-light displays added 
usefulness in the examination of social phenomenon. It is now possible to 
record real-life social events and, using computer technology, attach point-
lights to the individuals involved. In this fashion, the amount and location 
of kinematic information could be manipulated and measured, metrics 
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applied to m.ovem.ent in the optical array, and variables, such as direction 
of entry which caused problems in this experiment, could be controlled by 
computer aided 'flipping' of the picture so the identical event was viewed 
from. both directions. Using this kind of technology would also overcome 
the problems experienced in this study regarding the accurate 
representation of events using simulations and the introduction of 
confounding variables such as the 'distance between' actors. Computerised 
placement of point-lights on events filmed in the real world would more 
closely examine what Warren and Shaw (1985) suggested the appropriate 
unit of analysis for ecological psychology should be, "an ecological event" 
(p. 10), and reduce criticism. of the use of staged or role-played events. 
This entire area of research is yet to be fully examined and appears to hold 
some promise for the usefulness of point-light displays as effective 
research methods. 
Predicting social behaviour 
Finally, point-light techniques m.ay be useful in examining the 
prediction of social behaviour. Based on the arguments of Reed (1982), 
Runeson (1985) stated that "the occurrence of pre-adjustment of posture is 
a universal feature of our action system." (p. 59). In other words, co-
ordinative structures m.ay be set up more or less in advance of action and 
therefore m.ay prevail in the system. for extended periods, even when the 
person is not moving at all. According to Runeson, the "system. does not 
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have to wait for sensory feedback concerning the relative effects before it 
can compensate. Active and reactive effects are lawfully related through 
mechanics and the action system. is organised to take advantage of this" (p. 
59). This point is extremely relevant to nonverbal research in that the 
kinematics m.ay specify the intentions, expectations, and/ or emotions of 
the individuals involved in dyadic social events, and perceivers m.ay 
obtain this information directly and accurately without having to evoke 
schemas, scripts and/ or categorisations, and such information m.ay be 
available even when the actual behaviour has yet to take place. Therefore, 
showing participants varying portions of a social event and asking them. to 
predict the nature of the event to follow could be a way of controlling 
information, measuring the critical actions setting up behaviour, and 
finding possible support for Runeson's argument. This could be 
accomplished either through using simulated events or by recording real-
life social events and attaching point-lights. In this way, usefulness of 
kinematic information in predicting social behaviour could be examined, 
as well as isolating what information has specificity to the prediction of 
social behaviour. This same technique could be utilised to examine 
dispositions, traits, emotions, and other previously phenomenon 
previously considered intrinsic or hidden. 
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Summary 
This preliminary study attempted to examine from an ecological 
perspective the ability of perceivers to identify the nature of simulated 
dyadic events from point-light displays. Results at least partially 
supported the arguments of Runeson and Frykholm (1983), Runeson 
(1994), and Good (1986, 1987) that perceivers could identify social events 
when presented with kinematic information only. However, several issues 
became apparent as a result of this study. 
Firstly, control over information is vital. While this study showed 
that participants could identify two out of the three dyadic events equally 
well from kinematic only and full-visual displays, there was a significant 
difference for one of the events. Unfortunately, as there was no control 
over information in this study, it was not possible to determine what 
information was either missing, not attended to, or inadequate in the 
kinematic version of events that was available to and used by participants 
in the full-visual condition to make more accurate identifications. It 
appeared that the reductive nature of point-light displays was irrespective 
of specificity and the informativeness of information can only be 
determined if it is adequately controlled. 
Secondly, suitable metrics for amount and type of information must 
be employed. Gross optical movement, gross changes in joint angles, 
and/ or amount, number, location, or configuration of point-lights are but 
some of the possibilities. Such metrics need to have specificity to the 
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variable(s) under examination and the information measured needs to be 
carefully controlled. A measure such as gross optical movement could 
have been employed in this study to identify and measure differences in 
gestural animation and allowed for more conclusive arguments regarding 
gestural vigorousness. Other types of measures, such as tracking of eye 
movement and reaction times could also be employed. 
Thirdly, while acceptable, caution needs to be employed when 
using actors to simulate real-life social events. In this study a confounding 
variable was inadvertently introduced by placing constraints on the actors 
(i.e., controlling for the 'distance between'). Researchers need to take 
particular care when replicating natural events and to ensure what they 
are controlling is measurable and part of the experimental design. Use of 
professional actors could provide ways of controlling information, such as 
in 'over' or 'under' acting to isolate particular movements and their 
specificity to events. While previous findings suggest perceivers are good 
at picking up information specifying deceptive intent, there are still 
bonuses in using such techniques provided researchers are cautious in 
reporting their findings. 
Despite the constraints mentioned above, this study did show that 
participants could identify the nature of some dyadic events when viewing 
kinematic information only, and that at least for two of the three events 
they could do so at levels equal to those of participants exposed to a full-
visual version of events. It appeared that information specifying the 
nature of these two dyadic events was available, attended to, and adequate 
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enough for participants in the kinematic only condition to make accurate 
identifications of the corresponding dyadic events. 
Furthermore, this study supported Runeson and Frykholm's (1983) 
argument that point-light displays are more effective when vigorous 
gestural animation is apparent, suggesting the use of whole-body 
kinematics may need to be restricted to events with relatively high levels 
of gestural vigorousness. However, it was not apparent whether this is 
really a requirement, or if adding other information (such as facial 
information) to point-light displays would result in an increase in accurate 
identification of events, particularly those low in gestural animation. 
Further research is required in this area. 
The prediction that by providing participants with a forced-choice 
task would result in an increase in identification of events, while 
supported in this study, did not necessarily allow for the argument that 
such increases were due to attunement of the perceptual system. 
However, several research possibilities were put forward that could assist 
in overcoming the arguments of Garner and others regarding response 
uncertainty. 
While results of this study did not support the perceptual 
differentiation theory of E.J. Gibson (1969), nor the prediction that 
differences would exist between the sexes, suggestions were made to assist 
future researchers in adequately addressing each of these issues. 
Indeed, this study offered numerous suggestions as to avenues for 
further research using point-light techniques. Such areas as the study of 
103 
dispositions, emotions, intentions, and the prediction of social behaviour 
were covered and possible research techniques suggested. It appeared that 
the use of point-light techniques offered unique potential in the further 
examination of social phenomenon from an ecological perspective 
provided researchers are vigilant to ensure information is controlled, 
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University of Canterbury 
Department of Psychology 
INFORMATION 
You are invited to participate as a participant in the research project: 
"The kinematic specification of dynamic 
social interaction using point-light displays." 
The aim of this project is to see if people can accurately judge the nature of 
a social interactions based upon the body movements of the couple 
involved in the event. 
Your involvement in this project will take approximately 10 minutes and 
involve you in watching several video clips and firstly verbally reporting 
on what you see happening, and secondly, answering a questionnaire as to 
what you think is happening in each video. 
Once you have completed this experimental session there will be no 
requests made of you for further involvement in this project. 
In the performance of the tasks and application procedures there are no 
foreseen risks to you of any kind. 
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the 
complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: the identity 
of participants will not be made public without there consent. To ensure 
anonymity and confidentiality, only numbers will be used on the data 
sheets and these numbers will in no way be correlated to names on consent 
forms. This way there will be no way to trace any particular answer sheets 
to any particular person involved in the project. 
The project is being carried out by Morry Shanahan, who can be contacted 
at 364-9072. He will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have 
about participation in the project. 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of 





"The kinematic specification of dynamic 
social interaction using point-light displays." 
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. 
On this basis I agree to participate as a participant in the project1 and I 
consent to publication of the results of the project with the understanding 
that anonymity will be preserved. I understand also that I may at any time 
withdraw from the project prior to conclusion of the session, including 
withdrawal of any information I have provided. 
Signed............................. Date ................. . 
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APPENDIXC 
DATE:_/_/_ TAPENO._ SEX_ ORDERNO. 
Please mark the answer you think is most correct: 
This event shows; 
1. _ good friends meeting after not seeing one another for a while, 
_ good friends meeting as they do most days, 
_ good friends meeting after having had a disagreement. 11 
2. _ good friends meeting after not seeing one another for a while, 
_ good friends meeting as they do most days, 
_ good friends meeting after having had a disagreement. 11 
3. _ good friends meeting after not seeing one another for a while, 
_ good friends meeting as they do most days, 
_ good friends meeting after having had a disagreement. 11 
4. _ good friends meeting after not seeing one another for a while, 
_ good friends meeting as they do most days, 
_ good friends meeting after having had a disagreement. 11 
5. _ good friends meeting after not seeing one another for a while, 
_ good friends meeting as they do most days, 
_ good friends meeting after having had a disagreement. 11 
6. _ good friends meeting after not seeing one another for a while, 
_ good friends meeting as they do most days, 
_ good friends meeting after having had a disagreement. 11 
..... etc. 
11. _ good friends meeting after not seeing one another for a while, 
_ good friends meeting as they do most days, 
_ good friends meeting after having had a disagreement. 11 
12. _ good friends meeting after not seeing one another for a while, 
_ good friends meeting as they do most days, 
_ good friends meeting after having had a disagreement. 11 
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APPENDIX D 
Instructions to Coders 
You are about to listen to responses given by subjects in an 
experimental environment. Please listen carefully to each 
respondent and tick the box you consider most closely 
resembles their verbal response. Responses do not need to be 
identical to those on your marking sheet, but must resemble 
the choice more closely than the other options. 
Prior to commencement of each recorded response, please 
enter the subject identification number in the appropriate 
space on the marking sheet. 
Should you want to listen to any of the responses more than 
once, please let the experimenter know immediately and the 
verbal response will be replayed again. 
Please do not discuss your selections with anyone and the 
experimenter will answer any questions you may have 
regarding the nature of the experiment after all coding has 
been completed. 
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